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A potentially huge untapped resource of natural gas exists just off-
shore almost every coastal state in the world, the resource called me-
thane hydrates. The opportunities for fiscal revenues, energy
security, and freshwater resources will be attractive to many of those
states; for many, the commercial development of offshore methane
hydrates could bring substantial improvements to public welfare.
But offshore methane hydrates present new and potentially cata-
clysmic risks in their extraction and production. There are risks of
voluminous greenhouse gas emissions, subsea landslides, and tsuna-
mis. There are also a variety of non-cataclysmic risks posed by the
development of offshore methane hydrates. Most of these risks are
novel and were not present in earlier offshore oil and gas extraction
projects.
The need to provide legal guidance to optimize the reduction of
risk and hazards from the extraction and production of offshore me-
thane hydrates should be addressed in advance of initial commercial
operations. This paper calls for the application of civil liability rules
to be a part of the governance mechanism of that environment risk,
and in particular, for the rule of strict liability to be applied.
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grateful to Prof Dr. Michael Faure (Erasmus), Prof. Dr. Louis Visscher (Erasmus),
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Legal clarity is needed to govern risks of offshore methane
hydrates
The overall scale of this new energy resource, of offshore methane
hydrates, has been estimated at 100-times the currently identified
commercial reserves of petroleum and natural gas; bluntly put, the
volumes of known petroleum and natural gas are a rounding error
within the estimates of offshore methane hydrates. Unique to this
form of natural gas are its icy structures of methane and water that
could enable carbon sequestration simultaneous to the extraction of
the methane volumes from the methane hydrate deposits; this re-
placement of methane with carbon dioxide could enable a 'green me-
thane.' Additionally, the water volumes stored within methane hy-
drates could provide large volumes of fresh water, especially to arid
states in Africa.
Offshore methane hydrates have not been previously developed for
several reasons. First, until recently, they were unknown to exist in
such large deposits; but extensive exploration and modeling since
their discovery have revealed their abundance. Second, the technol-
ogy to enable commercial production required substantial develop-
ment beyond traditional offshore national gas production
technologies; but the technology is now arguably functional, as Japan
has operated continuous offshore methane hydrate wells, and conti-
nual cost improvements have brought the commercial feasibility of
the technology in range of certain market conditions. Additionally,
several states have committed to the production of offshore methane
hydrates as part of national energy security planning; Japan has
committed to begin commercial production of offshore methane hy-
drates by the 2020s.
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrates will
necessitate planning for accidental risk. Due to the unique risks and
hazards associated with the development of offshore methane hy-
drates, it is unlikely that their development would be capable of be-
ginning without some form of ex ante risk governance mechanism
such as civil liability or regulations. Potential operators would want
legal certainty in the consequences of their operations, protection of
their licenses and safety from retroactivity and ex post determinations
of liability. People living in the areas potentially affected would
hope for a minimum of risk and hazard but also expect due processes
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to provide for the recovery of their harms and damages. Govern-
ments and other public organizations would want to monitor their
stewardship of natural resources, to balance the economic growth op-
portunities presented by offshore methane hydrates against the poten-
tial welfare impacts of environmental hazards, and to provide social
cohesion to enable all of the parties to remain engaged in solving the
complex resource use problem; also, many states will be required to
engage in environmental impact assessment reviews prior to issuance
of production licenses or the onset of operations. All parties have in-
centives to prefer legal clarity prior to the onset of production.
1.2 Research question and methodology
This study will present a review of the risks and hazards of off-
shore methane hydrates, of the general theories of when civil liability
rules might be efficiently employed, and a synthesis examining what
rule of civil liability might optimally govern the risks and hazards of
offshore methane hydrates.
First, the unique and distinguishing circumstances of offshore me-
thane hydrates will be explored and explained. Insight into their
unique and unusual risks and hazards will be developed. This study
reviews the fundamental science of offshore methane hydrates. It
provides a review of the benefits that the development of offshore
methane hydrates might afford.
Second, a review of research literature from law and economics
will be made, first for strict liability and then for negligence. The re-
search question therein is under which scenarios is a rule of strict lia-
bility expected to be efficient and under which scenarios would a rule
of negligence be expected to be efficient? A collection of answering
scenarios for both rules will be provided.
Third, and contained within each respective section, strict liability
and negligence will be evaluated against the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of offshore methane hydrates. Strict liability will be ex-
amined for fitness and robustness against the circumstances of
offshore methane hydrates and similar analyses will be provided for
the rule of negligence.
Finally, a recommendation will be made for the application of
strict liability as the more robust rule of civil liability for offshore
methane hydrates. The unique facts and circumstances of offshore
methane hydrate appear to strongly align with the scenarios wherein
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rules of strict liability have been generally demonstrated to be more
robust at optimizing the efficiency of risk reduction efforts. The con-
clusion does not draw a door shut on other forms of governance, such
as public regulation, but rather reveals that rules of civil liability
could efficiently reduce the risks of accidents and, second, that the
rule of strict liability would be more robust than negligence in obtain-
ing those results for offshore methane hydrate projects.
2. THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFSHORE METHANE
HYDRATES
Methane hydrates are physically and chemically different in the
way that they manifest in nature from traditional oil and gas. Off-
shore methane hydrates might provide economic, environmental and
other benefits not provided by traditional oil and gas. Furthermore,
offshore methane hydrates would present novel risks and harms that
traditional oil and gas have not. This section attempts to provide a
primer on the facts and circumstances of offshore methane hydrates.
The following subsection will first set out the history and early de-
velopment of methane hydrates. It will review the technological de-
velopment and suggest that the onset of commercial development of
offshore methane hydrates might be imminent. It will provide an in-
troduction to the chemistry and energy content of methane hydrates.
Finally, it will discuss where offshore methane hydrates might be
found, both geo-physically and geo-politically.
The second subsection will provide an introduction to the potential
or expected benefits of the commercialization of offshore methane
hydrates. The vast potential resource base of offshore methane hy-
drates is detailed. The potential for offshore methane hydrates to
provide a price-competitive alternative to liquefied natural gas
("LNG") imports is reviewed. The potential for hydrates to support
green energy alternative is reviewed with regards to carbon seques-
tration, hydrogen fuel production, and as a 'healthier' alternative to
coal and crude oil. Finally, the potential for offshore methane hy-
drates to support freshwater production is explored.
The third subsection will provide an introduction to the potential
risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates. The centrality of
harm resulting from methane is detailed, as a greenhouse gas, as an
asphyxiant gas, as a marine pollutant, and as a source of other harms,
methane is the central problem, not crude oil as in traditional wells.
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Both the non-cataclysmic and cataclysmic types of risks and hazards
are explained.
2.1 An introduction to offshore methane hydrates
While methane hydrates have been recognized since the 1800s, I it
was not until the 1990s that methane hydrates were broadly recog-
nized as a potentially feasible energy source and respondent research
and development programs initiated.2
Despite the novelty of the idea of offshore methane hydrates as an
energy resource, the science and engineering related to their potential
development has improved consistently in recent decades. The first
initial offshore survey was undertaken in 1970, and the first recovery
of offshore methane hydrates occurred in 1981. 3 The first offshore
methane hydrate well was drilled in 1999. 4 The first continuously
flowing methane hydrate well was tested offshore Japan in 2013.
The development of coal bed methane production technologies
took approximately three decades to progress from discovery of po-
tential to commercial feasibility and investment. It has been sug-
gested that the arc of development for methane hydrate production
1. Methane hydrates were first discovered by Humphrey Davies in 1810.
Jorge F. Gabitto, & Costas Tsouris, Physical Properties of Gas Hydrates: A Review,
2010 J. THERMODYNAMICS 1, 1; Carolyn A. Koh, Towards a Fundamental Under-
standing of Natural Gas Hydrates, 31 CHEMICAL Soc'Y REV. 157, 157 (2002).
However, it is suspected that Priestly was the first to observe hydrates. See Ayhan
Demirbas, Methane Hydrates as Potential Energy Resource: Part 1-Importance,
Resource and Recovery Facilities, 51 ENERGY CONVERSION MGMT. 1547, 1548
(2010). The science of their internal composition was first reported by Michael Fa-
raday in 1823. See Koh, supra note 1, at 157; Peter Englezos & Ju D. Lee, Gas
Hydrates: A Cleaner Source of Energy and Opportunity for Innovative Technolo-
gies, 22 KOREAN J. CHEMICAL ENGINEERING 671, 672 (2005).
2. See Demirbas, supra note 1, at 1548; Yuri F. Makogon, Stephen. A. Hol-
ditch & T.Y. Makogon, Natural Gas-Hydrates-A Potential Energy Source for the
21st Century, 56 J. PETROLEUM SCI. & ENGINEERING 14, 16-18 (2007); Jill Mar-
celle-De Silva & Richard Dawe, Towards Commercial Gas Production from Hy-
drate Deposits, 4 ENERGIES 215, 216 (2011).
3. See Demirbas, supra note 1, at 1548; Makogon, Holditch & Makogon, su-
pra note 2, at 16.
4. See Demirbas, supra note 1, at 1548; Makogon, Holditch & Makogon, su-
pra note 2, at 16.
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technologies will follow a similar progression.5 Due to the strategic
needs of countries like Japan and South Korea to obtain local secure
energy supplies, researchers in the Global Carbon Project have fore-
casted that commercial methane hydrate investments would begin by
2020 and spread to fields globally by 2030.6
In the case of methane hydrates, the methane molecule is trapped
within a water-ice framework.7 The overall water-ice structure vi-
sually resembles white snow; the methane does not impact the overall
appearance of the methane hydrate structure. 8
Methane hydrates are crystalline solids composed primarily of me-
thane and water.9 The water forms polyhedral lattices that are stabi-
lized by the inclusion of methane or other molecules. 1 0
Methane hydrate deposits present a dense form of methane. In
terms of energy content, methane hydrates, as fully occupied hy-
drates, contain 184,000 btu per cubic foot, in-between conventional
natural gas at 1,150 btu per cubic foot and LNG at 430,000 btu per
cubic foot. 1 The disassociation of 1 m3 of methane hydrates produc-
3 12es 170 m of methane at standard temperature and pressure. In ad-
5. Englezos & Lee, supra note 1, at 675, 677. The time reference is stated as 3
decades on pp. 675 and as 20-25 years on p. 677.
6. Volker Krey et al., Gas Hydrates: Entrance to a Methane Age or Climate
Threat?, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 34007, 4 (2009).
7. Richard A. Dawe & Sydney Thomas, A Large Potential Methane Source-
Natural Gas Hydrates, 29 ENERGY SOURCES 217, 218 (2007). Kurihara refers to
hydrates as "in the solid state and hence does not have a flowability." See Masanori
Kurihara et al., Gas Production from Methane Hydrate Reservoirs, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAS HYDRATES (2011).
8. See Dawe & Thomas, supra note 7, at 218; Demirbas, supra note 1, at 1550.
9. See Dawe & Thomas, supra note 7, at 218; Koh, supra note 1, at 157;
George J. Moridis et al., Toward Production from Gas Hydrates: Current Status,
Assessment Of Resources, and Simulation-Based Evaluation of Technology and
Potential, 12 SPE RESERVOIR EVALUATION & ENGINEERING 745, 1 (2009) (page
citations to working paper at SSRN); Demirbas, supra note 1, at 1550.
10. See Englezos & Lee supra note 1, at 672; Koh, supra note 1, at 157.
11. See Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra note 2, at 217. In more general
terms, see Englezos & Lee supra note 1, at 673; Demirbas, supra note 1, at 1548.
12. See Englezos & Lee supra note 1, at 673. See also Koh, supra note 1, at
160, wherein Koh provides a slightly different presentation of similar data. She
compares 90% occupied methane hydrates as equivalent to 156 m 3 of methane un-
der standard conditions.
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dition, 0.8 m 3 of water is released from the same cubic meter. I3 It
has been suggested that methane hydrates present 2 to 5 times greater
energy density than traditional gas reservoirs and 10 times greater
density than coal bed methane reservoirs. 14
The top of offshore methane hydrate formations are commonly
found at approximately 150m to 500m below the seabed, although in
equatorial waters that depth has been found lower at 1 OOOm. 
1 5
While the above description might suggest a smooth layer of me-
thane hydrates in-between mud layers; that is not how methane hy-
drates are deposited within the HSZ. 16 Methane hydrates have
complex geometries with major perturbances due to water flow, pres-
sure and temperature changes, and other factors. I7 In subsea depo-
sits, the most stable methane hydrates are those highest in the
reservoir with the most unstable, and gaseous, at the bottom of the re-
servoir. 18
Almost every coastal state in the world is expected to have some
amount of offshore methane hydrates. While traditional oil and gas
reservoirs have been found in fairly limited areas, methane hydrates
have been found on almost every coastline and in most arctic re-
gions. 19 As of 2009, methane hydrates had been drilled and recov-
ered from upwards of two-dozen countries in over 77 locations.
20
2.2 On the benefits of offshore methane hydrates
The benefits expected from the development of offshore methane
hydrates are primarily energy supply related; however, the benefits
represent more than simply more natural gas reserves. Offshore me-
13. See Englezos & Lee supra note 1, at 673; Demirbas, supra note 1, at 1548.
14. See Englezos & Lee, supra note 1, at 674; Demirbas, supra note 1, at 1550;
Zhen-guo Zhang, et al., Marine gas hydrates: Future Energy or Environmental
Killer?, 16 ENERGY PROCEDIA 933, 934 (2012).
15. See Dawe & Thomas, supra note 7, at 223; Makogon, Holditch & Mako-
gon, supra note 2, at 19.
16. Ray Boswell, Resource Potential of Methane Hydrate Coming into Focus,
56 J. PETROLEUM ScI. ENGINEERING 9, 11 (2007); see Makogon, Holditch & Ma-
kogon, supra note 2, at 19-21.
17. See Boswell, supra note 16, at 11; Makogon, Holditch & Makogon, supra
note 2, at 19-21.
18. See Dawe & Thomas, supra note 7, at 223.
19. Englezos & Lee, supra note 1, at 674.
20. See Gabitto & Tsouris, supra note 1, at 2.
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thane hydrates would impact the overall global energy market by di-
versifying the locations of abundant natural gas resources; for many
coastal countries offshore methane hydrates would be their first large
domestic supply of an energy resource. Offshore methane hydrates
are expected to soon become price competitive with LNG in general,
and may already be price competitive against certain spot prices in
that market.
Beyond the mere scale of energy supplies, offshore methane hy-
drates could support several green strategies. Offshore methane hy-
drates can be produced in coordination with carbon capture and
sequestration, potentially enabling low-carbon or carbon-neutral
energy supplies. Offshore methane hydrates might assist a hydrogen
economy; given the presence of water and methane, the methane
stock can be reformed into hydrogen fuel offshore alongside CCS for
the carbon dioxide by-products. Methane is well established to have
several environmental and health-related advantages over both coal
and crude oil combustion.
Finally, offshore hydrates contain vast amounts of freshwater; for
many arid countries these volumes could be significant in public wel-
fare projects.
2.2.1 A potentially huge supply of energy
The forecasted supplies of offshore methane hydrates dwarf tradi-
tional oil and gas supplies. 21 Because of the geographical diversity,
that almost every coastal country is expected to possess offshore me-
thane hydrates, the potential impact of large and local energy sup-
plies has potential game-changing status for many states and
economies.
The BP Statistical Review of World Energy estimates the current
world supply of proved reserves of natural gas, i.e. traditionally sup-
plied methane, at 187.3 Tcm, or 6614.1 Tcf,22 by the end of 2012. 23
21. See infra Table 1.
22. Much of the oil and gas industry utilizes Imperial Units instead of metric
measures. 1m' of natural gas is generally deemed equivalent to 35 ft3 for commer-
cial exchanges. See Dawe & Thomas, supra note 7, at 221. The BP Statistical Re-
views lists the exchange ratio as 1 M3 : 35.3 ft3. See BP STATISTICAL REvIEw OF
WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2013 44 (2013), available at
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-
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Another current estimate for global (conventional) natural gas sup-
plies places their volumes at 150 Tcm. 24 At current levels of global
production and consumption, this data forecasts 50 plus years of
supply from traditional natural gas, ceteris paribus.
2 5
But in turning to methane hydrates, Zhang et al. presented that
there is probably enough producible methane hydrate to provide the
whole world with sufficient energy supplies to last a millennium.
26
The U.S.'s Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act in-
cludes an estimate of the world's methane hydrate reserves that
would suggest that the world has over a hundred times more methane
27hydrates than currently booked natural gas reserves. The Klauda
and Sandler model of methane hydrate depositions forecast 120,000
Tcm of methane hydrates globally and over 80,000 Tcm of offshore
28
methane hydrates.
review/statistical review of world-energy_2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2013,
5:00 PM).
23. See id. at 22.
24. See Moridis et al., supra note 9, at 3.
25. BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, supra note 22. Note the
reserves to production ratios. Id. at 22. Also, these numbers can be contrasted
against the annual energy demand budget for the U.S.A., which is 1 Tcm annually.
See Moridis et al., supra note 9, at 3.
26. See Zhang et al., supra note 14, at 934; Moridis et al., supra note 9, at 2.
27. 30 U.S.C. § 2001(2)-(3) (2012).
28. The Klauda Sandler model has become the standard model because of its
ability to forecast both expected and unexpected real-world methane hydrate disco-
veries. See Moridis et al., supra note 9, at 3. See Jeffery B. Klauda & Stanley I.
Sandler, Global Distribution of Methane Hydrate in Ocean Sediment, 19 ENERGY
& FUELS 459, enpassim (2005).
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Table 1: Estimates for Global Methane Hydrates Versus
Conventional Natural Gas
Scientist(s)
BP Statistics 29
Englezos and Lee 30
Walsh - Low 31
Chatti - Low 32
Demirbas33
Collett
3 4
Englezos and Lee - Low 35
Englezos and Lee 36
Kvenholden and MacDonald37
U.S. Methane Hydrate R&D Act38
Englezos and Lee - High 39
Klauda Sandler
40
Walsh - High41
Chatti - High42
Tcm
187
370
2,800
3,100
7,104
9,000
10,000
20,500
21,000
24,000
40,000
120,000
2,800,000
7,600,000
Energy Source
Natural Gas
Natural Gas
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
Methane Hydrates
29. BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, supra note 22.
30. Englezos & Lee, supra note 1, at 674.
31. Mathew R. Walsh et al., Preliminary Report on the Commercial Viability of
Gas Production from Natural Gas Hydrates, 31 ENERGY ECON. 815 (2009). [The
original data is cited in standard cubic feet, which has been converted to Tcm for
this table.]
32. Imen Chatti, Anthony Delahaye, Laurence Fournaison, & Jean-Pierre Peti-
tet, Benefits and Drawbacks of Clathrates Hydrates: A Review of Their Areas of In-
terest, 46 Energy Conversion Mgmt. 1333, 1336 (2005)
33. Estimate was stated as 6.4 Trillion tons of methane. See Demirbas, supra
note 1, at 1551.
34. See Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra note 2, at 221.
35. Englezos & Lee, supra note 1, at 673.
36. Englezos & Lee, supra note 1, at 673.
37. Referred to as the standard estimate, partially due to their age. MacDonald's
numbers date from 1990. See Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra note 2, at 219.
38. This number is actually a statutory statement regarding the U.S.'s internal
estimate of its own domestic supplies, which it estimates at a quarter of the world's
supplies of methane hydrates. It provides an estimate of the domestic volumes at
200,000 Tcf. 800,000 Tcf converts to 24,000 Tcm. See 30 U.S.C. § 2001(2)-(3).
39. Englezos & Lee, supra note 1, at 673.
40. Referred to as the most up-to-date model and likely the most accurate. See
Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra note 2, at 219.
41. See Walsh et al., supra note 31.
42. Chatti, Delahaye, Fournaison, & Petitet, supra note 32, at 1336.
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2.2.2 Cost competitor to LNG
When methane hydrates were first discussed as a potential fuel
source in the 1990s it was technologically infeasible to extract me-
thane from methane hydrate deposits. 43 Since those years, the tech-
nology and scientific understandings of methane hydrates and their
reservoir structures has rapidly developed. It is likely that early
adopters will adopt methane hydrates for national energy policy and
strategic energy supply concerns followed by broader private invest-
ment as investment costs drop. 44 Optimistic estimates suggest that
the cost of developing offshore methane hydrate projects should be
15% to 20% more costly than comparably situated conventional natu-
ral gas projects. 45 Another forecast stated, based on technologies and
costs prior to 2008, that the incremental costs of production from a
medium-difficulty methane hydrate reservoir were $3/Mcf more ex-
pensive than production volumes from a conventional offshore natu-
ral gas well.46 A meta-discussion on several economic models from
2005 observed that offshore methane hydrate projects were feasible
when the price of natural gas exceeded $7 USD.4 7 Another model
found that offshore methane hydrate projects would be commercially
feasible if crude oil prices were to sustainably remain above $50
USD for the long run. 48 As none of these pricing scenarios are with-
out historical precedence, it is reasonable to expect that, in the near
future, offshore methane hydrates might become price competitive as
an energy resource, a very abundant, geographically well-diversified,
price competitive fuel source.
43. As noted earlier, certain fields have been produced that contained both natu-
ral gas deposits and methane hydrate deposits; but no 'pure' methane hydrate fields
has come online for continuous production as of December 2013.
44. See Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra note 2, at 230.
45. See Makogon, Holditch & Makogon, supra note 2, at 30. In particular, the
costs of well drilling are expected to be substantially lower due to the comparable
shallowness of methane hydrate deposits and the lack of rock to drill through, as
contrasted with conventional natural gas plays. The downside is that methane hy-
drate projects will likely need more wells to be drilled for comparable volumes to
be produced.
46. See Walsh et al., supra note 31, at 821.
47. See Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra note 2, at 230.
48. See Krey et al., supra note 6, at 3.
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2.2.3 A source of 'green energy'
The production of methane hydrates enables the potential seques-
tration of other GHG in the methane-depleted hydrates.49 Ultimately,
the production of methane hydrates could fit hand-in-glove with car-
bon capture systems/sequestration (CCS) technologies. 50 E.g., the
German government's SUGAR Projekt and its ECO 2 project are de-
signed with the goal of storing industrially produced carbon dioxide
in methane hydrate deposits; the methane extraction is seen as a cost-
recovery feature of a primarily-purposed CCS project. 51
Japanese researchers have investigated the potential to combust the
methane from the offshore methane hydrates on site to generate elec-
tricity; again the by-product carbon dioxide could be sequestered and
enable low-carbon electricity to arrive onshore by wire.52
2.2.4 A source of hydrogen fuel
Hydrogen fuel could be produced from the methane hydrates and
the by-product carbon dioxide could be sequestered; methane hy-
drates would, thus, yield a fully green carbon-neutral energy
supply. 53
Hydrogen has been widely advocated as one of the cleanest fuel
sources because its combustion with oxygen yields simply energy
and water. Should hydrogen transportation be sufficiently ad-
49. Ryunosuke Kikuchi, Analysis of Availability and Accessibility of Hydrogen
Production: An Approach to a Sustainable Energy System Using Methane Hydrate
Resources, 6 ENv'T, DEv. & SUSTAINABILITY 453, 467-468 (2005).
50. Marco J. Castaldi, Yue Zhou & Tuncel M. Yegulalp, Down-Hole Combus-
tion Method for Gas Production from Methane Hydrates, 56 J. PETROLEUM Sc. &
ENGINEERING 176, 178 (2007).
51. See more at Marine Biogeochemistry, GEOMAR,
http://www.geomar.de/en/research/fb2/fb2-mg/projects/ [hereinafter the Sugar
website].
52. Shigenao Maruyama et al., Proposal for a Low C0 2 Emission Power Gen-
eration System Utilizing Oceanic Methane Hydrate, 47 ENERGY 340, 342 (2012).
53. W. Rice, Hydrogen Production from Methane Hydrate With Sequestering
of Carbon Dioxide, 31(14) INT'L J. HYDROGEN ENERGY 1955, 1957 (2006). For a
similar proposal by Japanese researchers, see Kikuchi, supra note 49, at 462.
54. See Kikuchi, supra note 49, at 454. See also Castaldi, Zhou, & Yegulalp,
supra note 50, at 178.
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vanced, methane hydrates would likely be one of the main feedstock
for that future.55
Methane hydrates are a major potential source of a global hydro-
56gen fuel supply via methane reforming. Methane hydrates are
unique in their coproduction of fresh water and methane enabling hy-
57drogen to be produced at the point source. Methane reforming re-
quires methane as a fuel and a feedstock along with steam.5 8 The
chemical reaction is endothermic, requiring an energy input such as
heat from combusted methane.59 The resultant carbon monoxide can
be converted to carbon dioxide, suitable for re-injection into the hy-
drate deposit.
60
2.2.5 Environmental and health superiority to coal and crude oil
While the technologies of green and renewable energies develop,
the production of methane hydrates could provide an earlier window
of opportunity to eliminate coal and crude oil as fuel sources. Natu-
ral gas from methane hydrates provides very few pollutants and
would yield less carbon emissions than coal or crude oil.
There are three basic proposals for how methane hydrates could
provide energy more 'greenly' than coal or crude oil. Methane itself
provides approximately half the carbon emissions compared against
coal for the same amount of produced energy; methane also produces
fewer carbon emissions than crude oil. 6I Hydrogen fuel can be pro-
duced efficiently from methane hydrates, as water and methane are
basic feedstocks. What carbon dioxide is produced in the conversion
process can be re-sequestered in the hydrate formation.62 Finally,
55. See id. at 465.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 467.
58. The reaction equation is CH 4 - H 20 -_ CO + 3H2; methane and water can
produce carbon monoxide and hydrogen. See Kikuchi, supra note 49, at 456.
59. The reaction equation for combusted methane is generally given as CH 4 2
02 -_ CO 2 + 2 H20; combusting methane with oxygen yields carbon dioxide and
water. See also id.
60. The reaction equation is CO + H20 -_ CO 2 + 3H20; carbon monoxide and
water can be combined to yield carbon dioxide and water. See id.
61. See Englezos & Lee supra note 1, at 671; S.Y. Lee & Gerald D. Holder,
Methane Hydrates Potential as a Future Energy Source, 71 FUEL PROCESSING
TECH. 181, 183 (2001).
62. See Krey et al., supra note 6, at 4.
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electricity could be produced offshore from methane with simultane-
ous re-sequestration of the produced carbon dioxide back into the hy-
drate formation.63
The overall environmental pollution from the combustion of me-
thane is of a comparatively low degree when compared against the
carbon dioxide and other harmful emissions from the combustion of
coal, crude oil and less clean forms of natural gas.64 The combustion
of coal releases significant pollution beyond greenhouse gases that
can cause substantial risk to human health.65 Coal ash also contains
surprisingly substantial quantities of radioactive materials, which is
. 66
carcinogenic.
2.2.6 Co-production of fresh water
Methane hydrates are composed primarily of water and methane.67
While the primary focus in methane production is the reduction of
63. See id.
64. See Zhang et al., supra note 14, at 934. The combustion of coal and crude
oil, especially as diesel fuel, are known to cause a variety of health and medical in-
juries to frequently exposed communities. The combustion of coal and crude oil
provide the worst sources of fuel-based anthropogenic climate change. In Asia in
particular, the health risks can be extreme. The delivery of a geographically di-
verse abundant supply of methane, or of hydrogen, is an opportunity to save lives
and to save the climate.
65. A typical 600 MWW coal plant might release 14,100 tons of sulfur dioxide
(SO 2), 10,300 tons of nitrous oxides (NO.), 500 tons of small airborne particles,
170 pounds of mercury, and 114 pounds of lead annually. See Environmental Im-
pacts of Coal Power: Air Pollution, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean energy/coalvswind/cO2c.html.
66. In a report from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, UT Battelle for the
U.S. Department of Energy, it was estimated that American coal combustion emit-
ted more uranium as ash than America used as nuclear fuel. "According to 1982
figures, 111 American nuclear plants consumed about 540 tons of nuclear fuel, ge-
nerating almost 1.1 x 1012 kWh of electricity. During the same year, about 801
tons of uranium alone was released from American coal-fired plants. Add 1971
tons of thorium, and the release of nuclear components from coal combustion far
exceeds the entire U.S. consumption of nuclear fuels. See Alex Gabbard, Coal
Combustion, Nuclear Resource or Danger?, 26 ORNL REv. 18 (1993), available at
http ://web.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/rev26-34/text/colmain.html.
67. E.g., type sI methane hydrates are composed of 48 water molecules to 8 gas
molecules.
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methane from the methane hydrates, there is a tremendous volume of
water involved that can be captured as a by-product.
Table 2: Comparison of Produced Water Volumes
Type of Well Bbls per Million sef
Conventional gas well6  10
Coal Bed Methane 69  100
Methane Hydrates70  1,000
The contrast between traditional gas wells, coal bed methane wells,
and methane hydrate production is essentially a sequence of magni-
tudal differences.7 I
2.3 On the hazards and risks of offshore methane hydrates
The production of methane from methane hydrates will carry
unique risks and hazards to the environment not present with the pro-
duction of traditional natural gas. As seen in a Japanese environmen-
tal impact assessment, 2 the commercial development of methane
hydrates contains a mixture of risks, including risks common to all
offshore mining and risks unique to methane hydrates.73
What is most unique to methane hydrates is its hydrate structure.
The greatest unique environmental problem is the uncontrolled re-
lease of methane hydrates from a collapse of the hydrate structures.
Methane is a known greenhouse gas. Methane has a global
warming potential index (GWP) 3.7 times stronger than carbon dio-
xide by mole number and 20 times stronger than carbon dioxide by
mass weight. 75 Thus, emissions of methane are generally seen as
68. See Walsh et al., supra note 31.
69. CYNTHIA A. RICE & VITO Nuccio, USGS, WATER PRODUCED WITH COAL-
BED METHANE (2000), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-0156-00/fs-0156-
00.pdf
70. See Walsh et al., supra note 31.
71. See supra Table 2.
72. See infra Table 3.
73. See infra discussion within Section 3.
74. See Zhang et al., supra note 14, at 935.
75. See id.
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worse for accelerating anthropogenic climate change than emissions
of carbon dioxide. The massive scale of methane hydrate fields and
their general presence in almost every coastal country presents a ha-
zard unlike traditional natural gas wells, in that certain accidents in
the development of methane hydrates could have global warming
impacts far beyond any previous oil or gas disaster.
There are many activities that could lead to the onset of disassocia-
tion of methane from the hydrates and that disassociation process
could occur in a variety of manners. That release of methane could
be slow and over long periods of time or sudden and cataclysmic.
Fast or slow, the uncontrolled release of methane is the primary risk
to the environment from developing methane hydrates.76
While the science is not yet comprehensive, it appears that, from a
planning perspective, there are two basic scenarios: events that dam-
age the methane hydrate stability so that it seeps methane on a conti-
nual but non-cataclysmic basis and those events that cause
cataclysmic releases of large volumes of methane. It is also impor-
tant to remember that the scientific consensus currently supports the
idea that methane hydrate events are geologically current and active,
that human interference is not beginning from a neutral position with
regards to the hydrates. There is a baseline amount of risk with any
in-place hydrates, and human activity adds onto that baseline.77
As part of the Japanese team operating offshore production tests
from methane hydrate deposits, Yabe et al. provided a table of seven-
teen identified risk factors and likely impacts.78 Yabe's chart pro-
vides sixteen basic events that could give rise to environmental
hazards, but only six basic hazards. 79 The key hazards identified by
the Japanese team are impacts to marine life, to fisheries, to aviary
ecologies, to benthic ecologies, and the broader scale items of tsuna-
mis 80 and anthropogenic climate change. The following few items
76. This would be in contrast to traditional oil spill events, wherein the main
hazard source is the spilt crude oil and its associated tars.
77. This makes it substantially different from oil and gas reserves trapped under
relatively permanent formations.
78. ITSUKA YABE ET AL., Environmental Risk Analysis of Methane Hydrate De-
velopment, in 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAS HYDRATES 4 (2011).
79. The present hazards are somewhat vague and high-level, so it may not be
sufficient for more careful enumerations of potential harms.
80. The chart provided by also listed the impact upon telecommunication cables
and production pipelines at the bottom of the sea bed. In short, subsidence could
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are unique to the production of methane from methane hydrates: seaf-
loor subsidence, submarine landslides, and the combined risks from a
cracked methane hydrate deposit bed.
The routine set of subsea mining risks are primarily related to the
building and operating of seabed infrastructure. The Yabe et al. list
of environmental impacts comes from a variety of exploration, de-
velopment and early production activities.81 Surface ships will have
a variety of emissions and discharges. Mooring lines will need to be
installed. The seabeds are disrupting with submersible drilling
equipment. Noise and vibration will be frequent and pervasive.
Drilling mud and cementing may reach the environment. Gathering
lines and their connecting manifolds need to laid and installed. Drill-
ing operations will require flaring as a safety system, but that implies
potentially large flares and venting will be needed on occasion. All
of these activities can impact the turbidity of the waters, cause re-
suspension of sediments, and create a variety of seabed disturbances.
Depending on the depth of the seabed, a variety of eco-systems can
be disrupted.
be the beginning of a very bad sequence of events. They also explain that the
landslide case is a more severe case of subsidence. Subsidence might damage sea
bed gathering systems, but the landslide would obliterate them. Yabe et al., supra
note 78.
81. Id. at 4.
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Table 3: Chart of Risk Factors and Impacts for Offshore
Methane Hydrate Development.
82
Item # Risk Factor
1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
2 Water Quality Change
3 Lightening
4 Interference in Fishery
5 Seafloor Disturbance
6 Underwater Noise
7 [Sediment] Resuspension
8 Increase in Turbidity
9 Marine Sediment Change
10 Seafloor Occupation
11 Seafloor Subsidence
12 Submarine Landsides
13 Cracks in Deposit - Disrupt
Methane Entry to Sediment
14 Cracks in Deposit - Methane
Leakage from Sediment
15 Flaring - Lightening
16 Flaring - Greenhouse Gas
Discharge
Impact
Global Warming
Impact on Marine Life
Impact on Marine Life and Birds
Impact on Fishery
Impact on Benthic Community
Impact on Marine Life
Impact on Benthic Community
Impact on Benthic Community
Impact on Benthic Community
Impact on Fishery
Tsunami
Tsunami
Impact on Benthic Community
Global Warming
Impact on Marine Life and Birds
Global Warming
2.3.1 Non-cataclysmic risks and
hydrate
hazards of offshore methane
2.3.1.1 Mechanics of methane venting and seeping
Without reference to commercial extraction of methane hydrates,
there are locations in the world today that cause methane hydrates to
disassociate and produce methane flows from the sea bed. West of
the island of Spitbergen, in the Svalbard archipelago northwest of
Norway, over 250 continuous bubble plumes have been discovered.
83
Observation of the plumes reveal that the methane transports from
200m to 400m below the sea surface to approximately 50m below the
82. ITSUKA YABE ET AL., supra note 78, enpassim. See Figure 3.
83. Magdalena A. K. Muir, Challenges and Opportunities for Marine Deposits
of Methane Hydrate in the Circumpolar Arctic Polar Region, 32 RETFAERD AER-
GANG 61, 63 (2009).
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surface, by which point the plumes are fully absorbed in the water
and no longer trackable. 
8 4
When methane is present in free water at low ocean depths, and
when there is not a separate mechanism for quick venting, methane
can take 100 to 1,000 years to reach the surface. 85 Given that long
duration of transit and of the ocean's oxidation of the methane while
in transit, it is forecast that most methane is converted to carbon dio-
xide before venting out of the ocean. 86
On the other hand, it has been verified that methane bubbles do not
need to exceed a certain saturation level to be able to reach the ocean
surface. 87 Ebullition can, and does, transport methane from seabeds
to the ocean surface, especially when the depth of the waters does not
exceed several hundred meters. Generally, it is agreed that the
amount of methane that will reach the atmosphere from seabed see-
page is dependent upon three factors: 88
i. the quantity and transfer rate of methane from the sedi-
ments to the water column,
ii. the volume of methane which dissolves in the water col-
umn, and
iii. the volume of methane which eventually escapes to the at-
mosphere.
Nature provides ready examples that methane can erupt from ocean
depths and reach the atmosphere chemically intact; sometimes me-
thane plumes can make it to the surface and ignite. Offshore Van-
couver Island in Canada, it has been discovered that methane
hydrates do have localized eruptions that result in gas chimneys to
transport the methane to the atmosphere directly. 89 After the erup-
84. See id. at 63.
85. See Krey et al., supra note 6, at 4.
86. See id.
87. N. Shakhova & I. Semiletov, Methane Release and Coastal Environment in
the East Siberian Arctic Shelf, 66 J. MARINE SYSTEMS 227, 236 (2007).
88. See Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra note 2, at 230.
89. Martin Hovland, Gas Hydrates, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GEOLOGY 261, 266
(Elsevier, Oxford, 2005).
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tions are completed, there are permanent structures left within the
hydrate deposit. 90
Similarly, mud volcanoes are often formed with gas hydrates as the
methane source.9I A mud volcano was witnessed in 1958 to sudden-
ly erupt. From approximately 150m below the Caspian Sea's sur-
face, the methane vented out at extremely high speeds and the
resulting flame was estimated at a height of 500m. 92 While it re-
mains unclear whether or not the methane erupted from methane hy-
drates or other sources, it is clear that high speed methane can and
does vent to the atmosphere; sometimes dramatically so.
2.3.1.2 Harms and hazards of vented and seeped methane
In the minimal case, the disruption of otherwise intact methane hy-
drates reserves could cause similar effects seen elsewhere in the
world today. But non-cataclysmic venting and seeping of methane
from disturbed methane hydrate beds could cause long-term risks and
harms.
Methane can be biogenically created by the anaerobic decay of or-
ganic materials underwater. 93 Bubbling and burping up in swamps, it
is considered a nuisance due to its distasteful aroma and potential for
nuisance flames.
Ambient methane is not toxic per se, but it is a simple asphyx-
iant.94 Methane has no noticeable smell to humans; the smell asso-
ciated with natural gas in home cooking fuel has a second chemical
added, mercaptan, 95 that provide that off-smelling stink to alert home
owners to gas leaks. In an industrial accident of unmodified me-
thane, as might erupt from a seabed, the workers would be chal-
lenged to evade an airborne poison that they cannot detect.
In the African nations of the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Rwanda, there are lakes that emit noxious but odourless volumes of
90. See id. at 266.
91. See id. at 267.
92. See id.
93. Ashna A. Raghoebarsing et al., Methanotrophic Symbionts Provide Carbon
for Photosynthesis in Peat Bogs, 436 NATURE 1153, 1155 (2005).
94. Methane, WISCONSIN DEP'T. OF HEALTH SERVICES (Dec. 2010),
http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/eh/chemfs/fs/Methane.htm
95. Methyl Mercaptan, CDC.GOv,
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/mhmi/mmg139.pdf
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methane and carbon dioxide. 96 This type of emission is called mazu-
ku; etymologically mazuku means "evil winds that travel and kill in
97the night," in Kiswahili. The emissions come from dissolved gases
within the lakes; the deep lakes stratify into three or more levels. 98
The ambient methane levels have been detected within the necessary
concentrations to enable air-borne combustion. 99 These mazuku
emissions have been known to kill both livestock and humans. 100
Even marine life has been impacted; at the time of the emission from
the lakes crawfish and crabs were observed struggling to exit the lake
and many fish were found dead soon after.101 Observational histories
detail that the lakes emit these gases with little warning and the ma-
zuku fills the valleys that the lakes are situated within. 102 There is es-
sentially no escape for all respirant life forms close to the lakes. 103
96. D. Tedesco et al., January 2002 Volcano-Tectonic Eruption of Nyiragongo
Volcano, Democratic Republic of Congo, 112 J. GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH B09202
5 (2007). See also Benoit Smets et al., Dry Gas Vents Mazuku in Goma Region
(North-Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo): Formation and Risk Assessment, 58
J. AFR. EARTH SCI. 787, 788 (2010).
97. See Smets et al., supra note 96, at 788.
98. In Lake Kivu, e.g., the hypo-limnion or upper-level of the lake waters con-
tains 265 km3 of carbon dioxide (C0 2) and 54 km3 of methane (CH 4). D. M. WA-
FULA ET AL., Natural Disasters and Hazards in the Lake Kivu Basin, Western Rift
Valley of Africa, in REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON NATURAL AND
HUMAN INDUCED HAZARDS AND DISASTERS IN AFRICA 1 (2007). That is the
equivalent of 54 billion cubic meters of methane or approximately 2 Tcf of me-
thane. The methane is biogenic, sourced from bacterial metabolisms, and the car-
bon dioxide primarily results from additional bacterial metabolism of the methane
and oxidation of the methane. See id. at 25. The dissolved gases can be released
and then emitted by a variety of mechanisms such as seismic activity or down-
swelling cold waters from rain run-offs. See Tedesco et al., supra note 96, en pas-
sim. See also Wafula et al., supra note 98, at 26.
99. See Tedesco et al., supra note 96, at 5.
100. See Smets et al., supra note 96, at 787.
101. See Tedesco et al., supra note 96, at 6.
102. See Smets et al., supra note 96, at 789.
103. See id. at 794. Due to these hazards, engineers have installed gas evacuation
systems to pump out excessive emissions before they build to dangerous levels; the
methane is used to power an electrical plant. For the Environmental and Social
Impact Assessment summary generated by the African Development Bank for the
KivuWatt project. See SINCLAIR KNIGHT MERz LTD., ENVIRONMENTAL AND SO-
CIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (ESIA) SUMMARY: KIVUWATT POWER PROJECT (2009),
available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Environment
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Additionally, there are concerns that a field of leaking methane
could cause buoyancy problems for waterborne craft. 104 Indeed, it
has been modeled and discussed that certain conditions could lead to
a field of methane hydrates disassociating in such a manner that a
ship could lose its buoyancy and sink. 105 Non-buoyancy examples
also exist. Offshore oilrigs and boats have been lost when methane
suddenly erupted from below, and the boats became upended by the
displaced water pushed by the emerging methane. 106
Large amounts of methane could become dissolved into the benthic
waters and substantially impact sea life.l17 While the resource assets
at that depth are well studied, the ecologies of those depths are not. 108
Due to the location of methane hydrates, shallow within the seabed
itself, it is expected that the development of methane hydrates will
cause "significant impacts on the sediment dwelling fauna.' 1°9 Addi-
tionally, the energy levels of the benthic oceans are generally much
lower than upper levels of the ocean, preventing effective removal of
polluting debris. 1 1 0
When methane seeps are located at 300m below the water's sur-
face, and unless high velocities and large volumes are involved,
models suggest that 98% of the seeped methane could be absorbed by
bacteria prior to reaching the water's surface, metabolized into car-
bon dioxide. 11 Glasby provides a broad review of the recent litera-
alandSocialAssessments/EX% 20summary% 20ESIA% 2 0KIVUWATT% 20may%
2026th% 2020100 20English.pdf.
104. Ira S. Leifer et al., Engineered and Natural Marine Seep, Bubble-Driven
Buoyancy Flows, 39 J. PHYSICAL OCEANOGRAPHY 3071 (2009). See also Edward
A. Keller et al., Tectonic Geomorphology and Hydrocarbon Induced Topography
of the Mid-Channel Anticline, Santa Barbara Basin, California, 89 GEOMORPHOL-
OGY 274 (2007).
105. D. Adam, Methane Hydrates: Fire From Ice, 418 NATURE 913, 914 (2002).
106. See id. at 914.
107. G. P. Glasby, Potential Impact on Climate of the Exploitation Of Methane
Hydrate Deposits Offshore, 20 MARINE AND PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 163, 169
(2003).
108. Adrian G. Glover & Craig R. Smith, The Deep-Sea Floor Ecosystem: Cur-
rent Status And Prospects Of Anthropogenic Change By The Year 2025, 30
ENVTL. CONSERVATION 219, 220 (2003).
109. See Glover et al., supra note 108, at 232.
110. See id. at 220.
111. See Glasby, supra note 107; Keith A. Kvenvolden, Potential Effects of Gas
Hydrate on Human Welfare, 96 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. ScI. 3420 (1999).
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ture and finds that both modelers and field researchers agree that
when methane needs to transport through 300m or more of water
then the probability of any methane reaching the ocean's surface is
very minimal 112
When carbon dioxide increases its presence within the water col-
umn, several problems are found. First, the acidity of the water col-
umn is increased, causing stress to sea fauna. I I3 Second, there is a
risk of an affected area becoming a "mortality sink," wherein preda-
tors begin to prey off of the dead and dying fauna, further decreasing
population sustainability within the zone.114
A separate harm or damage can result from the extraction technol-
ogies. When chemicals are injected into the deposit to effect the dis-
solution of the hydrates, those chemicals are often toxic to those
lifeforms living near the hydrates.1 1 5 Not only do micro-fauna such
as zooplanktons and micronektons live near methane hydrates, but so
do macro-fauna such as tubeworms and mussels. 
1 16
Deepwater organisms already test positive for sea-borne chemical
pollutants.II7 The types of chemicals used to aid in hydrate dissolu-
tion are generally solvents and not water-soluble. As such, they are
the types of chemicals known to significantly affect the zooplanktons
and micronektons at the bottom of the food chain. 118 Such chemicals
often accumulate; they can become concentrated at magnitudes high-
er levels within the micro-fauna compared against the ambient water
column within which they reside. 119 The problems of toxicity are not
limited to the micro-fauna, as the food-chain presents toxicity in
birds and fish eaten by humans. 120 Those animals can carry toxicity
112. See Glasby, supra note 107, at 170.
113. See Glover et al., supra note 108, at 225.
114. See id.
115. Craig R. Smith et al., The Near Future of Deep Seafloor Ecosystems, in
AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: TRENDS AND GLOBAL PROSPECTS 334, 22 (2008).
116. E. Allison & R. Boswell, Dept. Energy, Methane Hydrate, Future Energy
Within Our Grasp, an Overview 9 (2007). See also Smith et al., supra note 115, at
22.
117. See Smith et al., supra note 115, at 22.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 23.
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levels higher than health limits for human consumption, making them
effectively poisonous to human diets. 121
2.3.2 Cataclysmic risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates
2.3.2.1 Mechanics of cataclysmic methane venting
There are two basic areas of concern for cataclysmic methane
events, the accidental and the strategic. The accidental catastrophe is
when routine operations of methane hydrates fields lead to a cata-
clysmic release of methane. The strategic catastrophe is when an ac-
tor decides to intentionally initiate a cataclysmic methane event. One
event can be characterized as tortious, but the other might need cha-
racterization as criminal or even belligerent under international law.
A cataclysmic event could see a large section of a hydrate field
lose its internal structure and shear off, causing the overlying mud
layers to fall deep into the ocean. Such an event might be correlated
with earthquake-like impacts such as tsunamis. The physical energy
of the shear-off would likely enable massive sudden venting of much
of the reservoir's methane directly to the atmosphere. That methane-
ous eruption would also likely induce surface combustion to a broad
area so long as the methane continued to vent from the shaken
depths.
The gas hydrate stability zones, wherein the deposits accumulate,
are fragile on both pressure and temperature vectors, and "[a]ny
change in temperature and pressure will cause it to decompose ....
A rapid release of substantially large amounts of methane could re-
sult in short-scale climate change.123 This perspective, when com-
bined with an awareness that the expected extraction techniques will
focus on warming the hydrates, on depressurizing the hydrates, and
injecting chemicals which stimulate the disassociation of the hy-
drates, leads to the conclusion that the extraction technologies must
effect a delicate balancing act to avoid triggering what could become
a deposit wide disassociation event and a massive release of methane
and freshwater from the hydrate deposits. The extraction of methane
121. See id.
122. See Zhang et al., supra note 14, at 935.
123. See id.
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from methane hydrate deposits might always remain an extremely
hazardous activity even if otherwise desirable.
The resulting behaviour of the high-volume venting methane is to
create a chimney-like structure that connects the hydrate bed to the
atmosphere above the ocean water, enabling a direct pipeline of me-
thane ventilation.124 So long as the buoyancy of the methane bubbles
and the pressure from the emitted methane can be maintained, the
chimney would be sustained. Thus, once in place, a chimney could
provide a manner for a massive methane emission event to occur.
All of that methane is potentially combustible at atmospheric condi-
tions, but incomplete combustion is likely to result. Thus some of the
methane will be directly absorbed by the atmosphere and act as a
greenhouse gas while a separate portion of the methane is likely to
combust and explode above the ocean's surface.
Additionally, the destabilization of one location is likely to affect
the pressure and temperature of nearby deposits, especially if they are
in communication.12  Therefore, the establishment of one chimney
would result in substantial depressurization of nearby deposit and po-
tentially enable other chimneys of emission.
Such accidental events have already been witnessed. An acciden-
tal chimney was formed on the Pechora shelf when a drilling attempt
through a subsea permafrost encountered a hydrate layer. 126 The re-
sulting surge of free methane created a gas-water fountain that rose
over a 100m through the waters and shot into the air 10m above the
drilling ship. 127
While the probabilities of sudden massive venting events are diffi-
cult to gauge given a lack of historical data, the geological record
strongly suggests that cataclysmic venting has occurred in pre-history
and earlier periods, and there are subsea craters that reflect massive
124. See supra Section 3.1.
125. "Communication" occurs when gases, liquids, and kinetic energy are shared
or transmitted through the deposit system. The motives can be capillary action,
Boyle's Law or Charles's Law. For examples of means in hydrates, see supra Sec-
tion 3.3.2.
126. See Shakhova & Semiletov, supra note 87, at 240.
127. See id.
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sudden blow-outs of methane.128 Up to 1 to 5 gigaton of carbon werereleased in those events, mostly in the form of methane. 129
2.3.2.2 Harms and hazards of cataclysmic methane venting
Methane hydrate deposits often occur on gentling sloping conti-
nental shelf areas; if disassociation occurs and methane and water are
released from the deposits, then the overlaying mud and sediments
may lose stability and collapse, causing a landslide. 130 This is not an
easy condition to induce, because the disassociation of water and me-
thane requires an energy source. 131 The beginning of a disassociation
in one location increases the pressure and thus improves the stability
of hydrates near the disassociation event. 132
It takes an unusual amount of energy or a unique displacement of
the methane hydrate bed to cause landslides,1 33 but they do occur.
Once they begin to occur, then they can enable positive feed-back
loops that enable more methane to be released and more landslides to
134
occur.
There are two known natural triggers: lowering sea levels, which
reduce pressure on the hydrates field-wide, and warmer oceans,
which heat up the hydrates field-wide. Commercial hydrate devel-
opment, with field-wide on-going extraction, would potentially offer
the types of trigger events necessary for deposit-wide disassociation
followed by a landslide.13 5 This is doubly so for those techniques
that combine volume extraction with in-situ heating to spur disassoc-
128. See Krey et al., supra note 6, at 4.
129. See id.
130. M.F. Nixon & J.L.H. Grozic, Submarine Slope Failure Due to Gas Hydrate
Dissociation: A Preliminary Quantification, 44 CAN. GEOTECHNICAL J. 314, 314-
315 (2007).
131. See id. at 315.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. N.L. Bangs et al., Massive Methane Release Triggered by Seafloor Erosion
Offshore Southwestern Japan, 38 GEOLOGY 1019 (2010).
135. When oil is raised from the reservoir to the production platform, it is often
quite a bit warmer than the adjacent seabed. There are known instances wherein oil
platforms ran their production lines through hydrate deposits, which then destabi-
lized as the production line warmed the seabed. See Nixon & Grozic, supra note
130, at 315.
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iation; 116 a combination of field wide depressurization and field-wide
warming.
There are certain limiting parameters for operational safety. Early
modeling suggests that shallow water hydrates, in waters shallower
than 300m, the hydrates will generally lack the conditions to enable a
landslide result.137 Additionally, there is certain depth, below 700m,
wherein both temperature and pressure are likely to be safely stable
despite changes in ocean temperature or changes of ocean depth.
138
The deeper the mud layer over the hydrates, the safer the deposit; but
the relationship is not linear. A slow improvement in safety is seen
as the mud approaches from no mud to 400m in thickness, but then at
approximately 400m the safety certainty make a dramatic jump, after
which only marginal gains to safety are made. 
139
Thus, there are envelopes of safety, albeit fuzzily described,
wherein hydrates could be extracted with high certainty of triggering
no landslide events. Some geological locations are safer than others;
the Beaufort Sea is seen as more likely to offer future landslide under
commercial development, whereas the hydrates in the Gulf of Mex-
ico may be more resilient to landslide events. 14 However, even the
safest areas were seen as capable of landslides under sufficient condi-
tions. 141
The prehistoric landslide of Storegga, offshore Norway, is perhaps
one of the best-known examples of a landslide believed to have been
caused by a methane hydrate event. It has been measured at over
800km long.142 The landslide is believed to have carried over 5,500
km3 of earthen material. The tidal waves and tsunamis that resulted
are blamed in large part for the submergence of Doggerland. Anoth-
er similar event occurred in the Kumano Basin, offshore Japan, about
50,000 years ago. 143 While the evidence for events such as Storegga
136. See Roy A. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus: Planning Ahead for the Com-
mercial Development of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 14:2 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.
& POL'Y (forthcoming December 2014) [The section "Extracting Offshore Me-
thane Hydrates" provides details of the extraction processes.].
137. See Nixon & Grozic, supra note 130, at 317.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 317, 319.
140. See id. at 321-322.
141. See id. at 323-324.
142. See Marcelle-De Silva & Dawe, supra note 2, at 232.
143. See Bangs et al., supra note 134, at 1021.
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and Kumano are ancient by human standards, geologically they are
recent events and the geophysical data suggests that similar processes
can occur today. 144 Of particular concern is that the gas hydrates
fields offshore Japan routinely experience earthquakes which could
trigger or assist in triggering landslides in gas hydrate fields. 145 If a
field is already weakened by commercial development, an earthquake
that might not have originally triggered a landslide might find the
depleted field more readily susceptible to collapse.
3. RULES OF CIVIL LIABILITY TO GOVERN ACCIDENTAL HARMS
Liability rules stem from the legal traditions, first enunciated under
the Roman lex Aquilia, 146 that tortfeasors I47 should be held responsi-
ble for the damages they cause to another person's property. Tradi-
tionally, liability arose from an idea of social obligations; it is the
flip-side of contractual or volitional obligations, in that liability arises
from non-consensually derived damages. 148
144. See id.
145. See id. at 1022.
146. Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Economic Analysis of Law: A European Perspec-
tive, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (2006).
147. A note on the vocabulary choices of this study. This study will primarily
employ the Anglo-American common law term tortfeasor as indicative of the lead
actor in an activity that gives rise to a tortious injury to a second or third party per-
son. Much of the economic literature employs the word injurer, certain quotes
herein retain that original word choice. There is not an effective difference in
meaning. Etymologically in English, tortfeasor derives from the Anglo-Norman
legal term tort fasieur, the tort-doer; and tort itself derives from Latin tortus, to
twist and thus to hurt, e.g., see torture. This phrasing is perhaps more active in
voice than the term delict, which derives from the Latin de linquo, to depart from
or to be missing, i.e., to evade one's duties. Injurer derives from the Anglo-
Norman borrowing from Latin of iniuria, or the lack of a legal right. Both injurer
and tortfeasor indicate an actor who violates another's lawful rights. Interestingly,
the etymology of the word victim derives from the Latin word for a sacrificial ani-
mal, implying that the victim played a passive role in their resultant injury. If so,
then perhaps there is a linguistic bias to be careful to take note of, that victim in the
law and economics literature does not suggest unilateral nor bilateral nature of an
accident but merely the party counterpart to the tortfeasor.
148. See Dari-Mattiacci, supra 146, at 2.
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3.1 Prioritizing accident reduction over compensation
Lawyers, both Civil and Common, have seen liability rules as a
system that provides compensation for victim of tortious acts. 149
There are valid critiques of this perspective, that using liability as a
source of compensation is substantially less efficient that other means
such as insurance. 150 The polluter pays principle is a principle of en-
vironmental tort law that reflects the fundamental paradigmatic fo-
cus, who pays what to the victim as a means of justice and
compensation.I15
In the last fifty years, a new school of thought has developed on
the proper role of liability rules. 152 Economists began to see liability
rules as a system of incentives to prevent unwanted behaviors and
outcomes. I53 Whereas the older notion was that tort law serves to
administer justice to those injured, the newer model evidenced that
tort law could serve to guide tortfeasors to optimal levels of risky be-
havior. The contrast of these two paradigms can be suggested as the
ex post compensation for damages versus the ex ante prevention of
harm.15 4 These two ideas, although espousing different teleological
ends, can be broadly compatible with each other. 1 55 Micro-economic
analyses suggest that incentives can be created or utilized that will
149. See id. at 3; Michale G. Faure, Environmental Liability, in TORT LAW AND
ECONOMICS 247, 249 (Edward Elgar, 2009).
150. See Dari Mattiacci, supra note 146, at 3; see also STEVEN SHAVELL, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 263 (Harvard University Press, 1987) [herei-
nafter Shavell, ACCIDENT LAW].
151. See Faure, supra note 149, at 249.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. M. G. Faure, Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from C02
Storage Sites, 26 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
155. Policy makers should be advised that if the liability rules are tasked with
both creating incentives to avoid inefficient levels of accidents and providing the
means to compensate accident victims, then the overall effectiveness to accomplish
either goal could be substantially diminished. See Faure, supra note 154, at 32.
See also Faure, Environmental Liability, supra note 149, at 249 (citing Gary T.
Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997)).
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push the actors to reach efficient levels of activity and risk; and thus
minimize wasteful compensation to victims. 156
In an economic view of liability rules, liability rules provide incen-
tives to the decision maker in current time to consider the potential
costs of future harms and hazards. 157 Taking those costs into ac-
count, the actor can then optimally choose the efficient level of care
for a given activity. "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure,"15 8 could be an apt summation of the theoretical perspective.
Calabresi stated that the objective of tort law is to minimize the so-
cial costs of a tort defined as the sum of the of total accident costs,
administrative costs, costs of properly allocating accident losses by
means of insurance, and accident prevention costs of both the tortfea-
sor and the victim.159 Finsinger and Pauly have added that norma-
tively, the net social welfare of any risky activity should be positive
in value. 160
The main goal of tort law is to internalize the externalities in order
to enhance optimal decisions on the level of precaution. 161
156. Matthieu Glachant, The Use of Regulatory Mechanism Design in Environ-
mental Policy: A Theoretical Critique, in SUSTAINABILITY AND FIRMS: TECHNOLO-
GICAL CHANGE AND THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 179, 181
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1998).
157. The concern is that certain events create costs or impacts that are not recog-
nized by the actor; economists call these costs "externalities". By using liability
rules, the legal system is able to redirect the costs of torts back to those who society
has decided should bear those external costs, usually the original tortfeasor. For
those individuals who are profit-seeking, such as corporations or investors in ener-
gy projects, the legal assignment for expost costs of damages can thus become ex-
pected costs of operational hazards and become included in ex ante decision
making on the project. Since the costs of the damages can be reduced by expendi-
tures for safety and caution, the operator/investor is able to efficiently gauge the
correct duty of care and ensure an efficient use of economic resources.
158. Faure, supra note 154, at 27 (paraphrasing Benjamin Franklin in the Febru-
ary 4, 1735 issue of The Pennsylvania Gazette).
159. Hans-Bernd Schfifer & Andreas Schdnenberger, Strict Liability Versus Neg-
ligence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 598 (Edward Elgar, 2000)
(citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1970)).
160. See Schfifer & Sch6nenberger, supra note 159, at 602 (citing J. Finsinger, &
M. Pauly, The Double Liability Rule, 15 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK INS. 159
(1990)).
161. See Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 146, at 4.
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The goals of liability rules are to find efficient levels of activity
and efficient levels of care or precaution for the parties involved. 
162
Liability rules can be used to control the behavior of one or of both
parties. I63 Liability rules can also directly impact or ignore activity
levels. 164 Liability rules are generally employed where transaction
costs appear to be barriers to Coasean negotiations to clarify contrast-
ing assertions of rights.
165
Liability rules are effective because they force actors to consider ex
post requirements to pay damages and compensation in ex ante deci-
sion making. 166 Including those impacts in ex ante decisions
processes should affect both care level and overall activity level deci-
sions. 167 This mixed paradigm has been in place for a longtime, and
as such is generally seen as uncontroversial. 168
3.2 Choice of instrument: strict liability versus negligence
Shavell was one of the first economists to develop models of liabil-
ity rules that enabled policy makers to evaluate the efficiency of a
particular liability rule to achieve the optimal level of accident avoid-169
ance. Given the intent of his models, it is clear that Shavell ex-
amined liability rules from the perspective that liability rules are tools
to provide ex ante incentives to avoid accidents. 170 He demonstrated
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 4-5. See also, en passim, Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Shavell, Strict Liability].
165. See Roy A. Partain, Public and Private Regulations for the Governance of
the Risks from Offshore Methane Hydrates (on file with Rotterdam Institute of Law
and Economics, available at
http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c fnabstract id=2466079).
166. See Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 146, at 3.
167. See id.; Faure, supra note 149, at 251.
168. See Glachant, supra note 156, at 2. See also Guido Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499 (1961);
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Shavell,
supra note 164; Hans-Bend Schfifer & Frank Miller-Langer, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS (2009).
169. See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541
(1979) [hereinafter Shavell, On Moral Hazard]; Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note
164; and Shavell, ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 150.
170. In this, Shavell set the theoretical stage to focus on how to efficiently reduce
the incidence of accidents and away from the question of how efficiently or justly
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that both strict liability and negligence could, under the right cir-
cumstances, provide efficient results to optimally manage the poten-
tial harms and hazards from accidents. 171
A standard economic model of tort law emerged several decades
ago and has been considerably refined. 172 The standard model broad-
ly supports the finding that a rule of strict liability would be prefera-
ble, or more efficient, to a negligence rule in most situations. There
are several theoretical models that extend support to the application
of negligence rules under certain circumstances. 173 The theoretical
impacts of ex post avoidance strategies, 174 of risk allocation, 175 of the
(a)symmetries of externalized costs and benefits 176 and of general in-
formational shortages 177 all lead to specific logics for the use of neg-
ligence rules.
The choice of strict liability versus negligence comes down to two
main tests: (i) which system provides more efficient incentives for
people to undertake safer activities and (ii) which system provides
more efficient incentives for people to make given activities safer?
178
those rules might provide compensation to victims. "The aim of this article is to
compare strict liability and negligence rules on the basis of the incentives they pro-
vide to "appropriately" reduce accident losses... In particular, there will be no con-
cern.. .with distributional equity-for the welfare criterion will be taken to be the
following aggregate: the benefits derived by parties from engaging in activities
less total accident losses less total accident prevention costs." See Shavell, Strict
Liability, supra note 164, at 1.
171. See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 164.
172. Jacob Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach, A Revised Model of Unilateral Ac-
cidents, 29 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 169, 169 (2009). See also id at 169 n.2. See
also Calabresi, supra note 159; Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 164; Richard A.
Posner & William M. Landes, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA.
L. REV. 851 (1980); Schfifer & Schonenberger, supra note 159; Schfifer & Muller-
Langer, supra note 168.
173. See Keith N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability, 4 REV. L. ECON.
153 (2008) (page references are to his working paper available at SSRN); Nussim
& Tabbach, supra note 172; Tim Friehe, Precaution v. Avoidance: A Comparison
ofLiability Rules, 105 ECON. LETTERs 214 (2009).
174. See Friehe, supra note 173.
175. Martin Nell & Andreas Richter, The Design of Liability Rules for Highly
Risky Activities - Is Strict Liability Superior When Risk Allocation Matters?, 23
INT'L REV. 31 (2003).
176. See Hylton, supra note 173.
177. See Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172.
178. See Schfifer & Sch6nenberger, supra note 159, at 598.
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Thus the policy maker is faced with determining which rule set is
more likely to be efficient in light of the circumstances surrounding
the activity to be regulated or influenced.
It will be central to this study to determine if the operations and the
risks of offshore methane hydrate installations fit within the standard
model or whether they merit the rule of negligence from other specif-
ic needs. First a review of the arguments for when strict liability
could be efficiently implemented is provided. Second, a similar re-
view of like arguments for when a rule of negligence might be effi-
cient applied is developed. A discussion of certain concerns
regarding the application of both rules is presented thereafter. Fol-
lowing those reviews, a summation of the potential arguments for the
application of the arguments to the conditions and circumstances of
offshore methane hydrates is presented. A conclusion is reached that
strict liability would be more efficient than a rule of negligence for
the nascent offshore methane hydrate industry.
4. WHEN STRICT LIABILITY IS PREFERABLE
There are several types of activities wherein strict liability has been
modeled to be more efficient at determining the optimal levels of ac-
tivity and precaution.
First, when the underlying harms and hazards are best described as
unilateral in nature, that the majority of the information needed to de-
termine the probability and severity of the accident is determined by
a single actor, then strict liability has been found to be optimal over
negligence. 179
Second, when activities are described as abnormally hazardous ac-
tivities, or activities wherein the externalized costs far outweigh the
externalized benefits to society, then strict liability has been found to
be optimal over negligence. 180
Third, when decentralization is a policy goal, strict liability is pre-
ferable. 181
Fourth, when the activities themselves are innovative and present
novel and uncertain risks and hazards, then strict liability has been
found to be optimal over negligence. 
182
179. See infra discussion, at 4.1.
180. See infra discussion, at 4.2.
181. See infra discussion, at Section 4.3.
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Fifth, when the transaction costs presented to the judicial systems
are matters of concern for the policy makers, then strict liability has
been found to be optimal over negligence. 183
The commercial development of offshore methane hydrates is well
characterized by these five scenarios. The commercial development
of offshore methane hydrates will primarily present risks and hazards
best characterized as unilateral in nature. Due to the severity of the
potential harms and hazards from cataclysmic methane hydrate
events, the operation of offshore methane hydrate projects could be
characterized as abnormally dangerous. As no offshore methane hy-
drate projects have ever been commercially developed, and as off-
shore methane hydrate deposits have never been produced for
yearlong periods, the activities of such offshore projects could be
characterized as innovative and presenting novel and uncertain risks
and hazards. Finally, as the geography of the known offshore me-
thane deposits lay offshore of jurisdictions with limited judicial re-
sources, it is likely for many of those jurisdictions that transaction
cost management will be of importance to their policy makers.
For these reasons, strict liability is likely to be more efficient for
the management of the harms and hazards from offshore methane
hydrate projects.184
4.1 Unilateral accidents -strict liability efficiently sets both
precaution and activity levels
Broadly speaking, the rule of strict liability has been found to be
efficient more often than the rule of negligence in unilateral models.
Both strict liability and negligence achieve efficiency with regards to
preventative measures within unilateral accident models. 185 Strict
liability is superior to negligence in that strict liability efficiently ob-
182. See infra discussion, at Section 4.4.
183. See infra discussion, at Section 4.5.
184. See infra discussion, at Section 6.
185. While Schfifer & Muiller-Langer 2009 offer perhaps the most recent demon-
stration of this result, their paper follows a history of similar findings, including the
seminal models of Shavell and the Landes-Posner systems; likewise, Schfifer has
published similar demonstrations with other authors. See Schfifer & Mfiller-Langer,
supra note 168, at 25.
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tains optimal levels of tortfeasor activity but negligence often can-
not. 186
Shavell proposed that accidents could be categorized into two sets
of models, unilateral accidents and bilateral accidents. Unilateral ac-
cidents are those in which only the tortfeasor's actions affect the
probability and severity of the accident. 187 Bilateral accidents are
those accidents that enable the actions of both the tortfeasor and the
victim to affect the probability and severity of the accident.
Under a rule of strict liability, 188 the tortfeasor is able to optimize
his utility as impacted by the costs he would bear in accidents. The
tortfeasor's optimand is the same as the social welfare function, thus
strict liability is efficient. 189 Shavell found that in the stranger-
stranger unilateral tort, that strict liability achieved efficiency by re-
quiring the tortfeasor to include the full costs of the accident in his
overall welfare function.19° Sch~ifer and Mtiller-Langer also demon-
strated that only strict liability provides for both efficient setting of
precaution and activity levels. Strict liability enables control of ac-
tivity levels and correctly sets an efficient level of activity. 191 Strict
liability enables control of activity levels and correctly sets an effi-
cient level of activity. 192
Under a negligence rule, the assumption is that a rational tortfeasor
would choose a level of care equal to the duty of care, i.e., that the
care level selected is the efficient care level.193 Then the tortfeasor
under a negligence rule is tasked with optimizing its utility function
given the tortfeasor's choice of activity level and the assumed duty of
care.194 The tortfeasor will select a higher level of activity than the
welfare efficient level of activity given the due care level, because
186. See id.
187. Unilateral accident models are those models that investigate the conse-
quences of a single actor's decisions on activity choice, activity level, and precau-
tion level.
188. In Shavell's unilateral formulation, the tortfeasor has a care or precaution
level and an activity level. Social welfare was defined as the sum of income equiv-
alent of the utility of the tortfeasor, less the costs of the activity at activity level.
189. See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 164, at 11.
190. See id. at 11-12. See Equation (2).
191. See Schfifer & Muller-Langer, supra note 168, at 25.
192. See id.
193. See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 164, at 11.
194. See id. at 12.
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the tortfeasor does not bear the costs of injuries incurred whilst oper-
ating at due care levels.195 Thus in stranger-stranger unilateral con-
texts, the negligence rule would yield results of due care but at
excessive levels of activity, resulting in higher than efficient levels of
accidents with the victims being required to bear the costs of those
accidents.196 This results in the tortfeasor engaging in an excess of
activity, excessive accidents result, and negligence is seen as ineffi-
cient.197 Negligence does not require the tortfeasor to consider cer-
tain costs so long as the prescribed duty of care is met, thus the
tortfeasor's activity level is too high and thus inefficient. 198
Table 4: Shavell's Unilateral Accidents - Are Liability Rules
Efficient?
Encounter Strict Liability Negligence No Liability
stranger-stranger Yes No No, worse
seller-stranger Yes No No, worse
seller-customer 99 Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes No
Yes No No
Under a 'no liability' rule, the tortfeasor exercises no duty of care
and bears no costs of the accidents so the activity level of the tortfea-
sor is guided solely by his personal utility, as affected by his selec-
tions of precaution and activity levels, 200 and again the tortfeasor
would over-engage in tortious conduct. Shavell ranks the cumulative
results as Proposition 1:
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that injurers and victims are
strangers. Then strict liability is efficient and is superior to
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. Schfifer & Maller-Langer, supra note 168, at 25.
199. Entries to the right reflect three orders of knowledge. In the top row, the
customer knows the risk of each seller. Middle row, the sellers' average risk. In
the bottom row, there is uncertain knowledge or misperception.
200. See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 164, at 11.
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the negligence rule, which is superior to having no liability
at all.201
In effect, strict liability forced the tortfeasor to internalize and
adopt Kaldor-Hicks-type welfare efficiency.20 2 The same scenario
under negligence requires only that the tortfeasor maintain a duty of
care but no additional costs from whatever accidents occur, so long
as the duty was met.203 Thus, when activities can be described as un-
ilateral in character, the common consensus is that a rule of strict lia-
204bility is strongly preferable to the rule of negligence.
4.2 Abnormally hazardous activities
Usually the first introduction a young law student has to strict lia-
bility is in relation to 'abnormally hazardous activities;' 20 5 as such,
abnormally hazardous activities are often the paradigmatic example
of when the rule strict liability should be employed. The main logic
is that when certain actors choose to engage in abnormally dangerous
201. Id. at 12. Note that Hylton's Positive Theory of Strict Liability model can be
shown to replicate the basic tenet of the Shavell-Landes-Posner model, that under
unilateral accidents both strict liability and negligence are efficient. See Hylton,
supra note 173, at 6. An identical result is reached for Shavell's seller-stranger
scenario. See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 164, at 14.
202. See id. at 11-12. See Equation (2).
203. See id. at 11-12.
204. Hylton provided a caveat to this result. Despite the potential equality of the
efficiencies offered under strict liability and negligence under certain conditions,
when the potential harms and benefits are small, actors might be more sensitive to
their own harms than other due to the differences in transaction costs to identify
both sets of data; in such environments Hylton found that negligence might be
more robust than strict liability. See Hylton, supra note 173, at 23.
205. Hylton listed the definitional elements, "In determining whether an activity
is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered:
a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chat-
tels of others;
b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on and;
f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes."
See id at 18-19. See UNITED STATES RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520.
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activities that other actors, not conjoining or consenting to such ad-
venturism, should not be expected to suffer for resulting harms of
those dangerous activities.
20 6
4.2.1 Controlling tortfeasor with strict liability in bilateral
accidents
When Shavell examines bilateral accidents, those accidents where-
in both parties have control over actions that lead to accidents, he
finds that the critical issue is 'which party do we want to control, the
tortfeasor or the victim?' 20 7 This is an extension of Calabresi's earli-
er cheapest cost avoider rule, that the person who could have pre-
vented the accident with the least cost of taking care should be the
person held liable for the accident.20 8
Shavell suggested that ultra-hazardous activities have two charac-
teristics which especially merit the application of strict liability
rules.20 9
First, the activities are
(i) "uniquely identifiable" and
(ii) "impose non-negligible risks on non-participant victims
which "make[s] the activity worthwhile controlling. 210
Second, the victim's engagement with the risky activity is entirely
routine in normal life, thus "activity that cannot and ought not be
controlled.,
21 1
Shavell's definition focuses on the rights of the non-participant
victims to remain undisturbed in their routine activities; this has
206. Expressed another way, strict liability operates similar to a finding of a
breach of duty of care, regardless of whatever precautionary efforts were taken,
whenever a tortfeasor caused injury via an abnormally dangerous activity. See
"Concluding Comments #4." See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 164, at 24.
207. See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 165, within 'Concluding Comment
#3' at 23.
208. See Schfifer & Miller-Langer, supra note 168, at 10. See Calabresi, supra
note 159.
209. Shavell examines the ultra-hazardous from a bilateral perspective in part
because a unilateral accident was already established to be more efficiently ad-
dressed with strict liability, even those ultra-hazardous in nature. See Shavell, Strict
Liability, supra note 164.
210. See Shavell's "Concluding Comments #4." Shavell, Strict Liability, supra
note 164, at 24.
211. See id.
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ready application to industrial activities that could be characterized as
212ultra-hazardous but occurring near populated areas.
Shavell then stated that given those descriptions of ultra-hazardous
activities that the application of strict liability to such dangerous ac-
tivities falls within his Propositions 4 and 6 from his model of bila-
213teral accidents between strangers.
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that the tortfeasor and victim
are strangers. Then none of the normal liability rules is ef-
ficient. Strict liability with a defense of contributory negli-
gence is superior to the negligence rule if it is sufficiently
important to lower tortfeasor activity levels. Strict liability
without the defense and no liability are each inferior to
whichever rule is better: either strict liability with the de-
fense or the negligence rule.21 4
PROPOSITION 6. Suppose that injurers are sellers and
that victims are strangers. Then the results are as given in
Propositions 4 and 5.215
As such, the goal becomes to efficiently incentivize the tortfeasor
to control his activity level and leave the victim unaffected in his ac-
tivity level; 2 16 this is best achieved by the rule of strict liability with
defense of contributory negligence.
212. Shavell's definition did not require much more than the imposition of "non-
neglible" costs of harm onto the victims so what might reasonably be characterized
as ultra-hazardous remained open ended. See his "Concluding Comments #4." Id.
213. In so doing, he implicitly assumes that the ultra-hazardous scenarios involve
victims cum strangers, and that a rule of contributory negligence is in effect. See
"Concluding Comments #4." See id.
214. See id. at 19. Hylton found that that the private liability rules provide dif-
ferent controls and that they do not necessarily provide the same result as the social
welfare optimand. Under strict liability, the actor responds to the cost conse-
quences of his own acts; under negligence the actor responds to the cost conse-
quences of the acts of other actors. This finding aligns well with Shavell's bilateral
accident model, but Hylton's model herein is a unilateral accident model. See Hyl-
ton, supra note 173, at 7, 10. See also Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 164, en
passim.
215. See id. at 20.
216. See Shavell's "Concluding Comments #4." See id. at 24.
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In the stranger-stranger scenario, he found that strict liability with a
defense of contributory negligence, efficiency could not be achieved
because the victims would bear no costs for accidents and would
217have no incentive to reduce their activity levels. The negligence
rule in this scenario reflects the reverse, that the tortfeasor will face
no costs to reduce activity levels and thus the negligence rule is inef-ficient. 218 Further, no liability rule and strict liability without contri-
butory negligence are rated as inferior to either of the two previous
results. 2 19 Thus, in bilateral stranger encounters, the policy choice is
inefficient but does enable the policy maker to reduce either tortfea-
sor activity levels under strict liability with contributory negligence
220or to reduce victim's activity levels with the negligence rules.
Indeed, Shavell proves that in stranger-stranger encounters, no
simple liability rule can be efficient. 22 1 These results are identical
when the seller-stranger scenario is modeled; it is more efficient to
use strict liability if the target is to reduce tortfeasor activity levels
and more efficient to use negligence if the target is to reduce victim
activity levels.222
Table 5: Shavell's Bilateral Accidents - Are Liability Rules Efficient? 223
Encounter Strict1  Strict1  Negligence No Liability
Stranger-Stranger No*' No***' No**' No***
Seller-Stranger No* No*** No** No***
Seller-Customer1  No No Yes Yes
Durable Goods No No Yes No
No No No No
Seller-Customer1  Yes No Yes Yes
Non-Durable Goods Yes No Yes No
Yes No No No
217. See id. at 19. Specifically, Shavell targets the condition of s = s = s* as the
cause.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 19-20. See Proposition 5.
222. See id. at 20. See Proposition 6.
223. See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 165, at 21-21.
[VOL. XXVI
FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Shavell's conclusions on bilateral accidents are much more com-
plex than for the unilateral accidents. Because the results are sub-
stantially different, it highlights the importance of correctlyidentifying events as unilateral or bilateral events. Unlike the unila-
teral results, no rule was found to be consistently efficient.224 But, if
the least cost avoider can be identified ex ante,225 then the application
of that principle to determine which actor should be regulated can be
combined with the appropriate choice of regime to obtain first best
results.22 6 If the tortfeasor were the least cost avoider, e.g., an off-
shore methane hydrate installation operator, then the rule of strict lia-
bility would be the robust choice.
Sch~ifer, et al., extended Shavell's unilateral accident model to es-
tablish an additional argument for the application of strict liability to
abnormally hazardous activities. They demonstrated that under a
negligence rule, the actor will over-engage in risky activity, whereas
under a strict liability rule the actor might under-engage in a risky but
socially beneficial activity.
227
As such, strict liability tends to require net positive social welfare
results whereas negligence rules tend to enable net negative social
228welfare results. If an activity is abnormally hazardous and has the
potential to expose victims to very expensive injuries, then strict lia-
224. However, there may be theoretical reasons to find negligence to be more
robust than strict liability when this model's assumptions are relaxed. That was the
result when Schfifer, et al., extended this section of Shavell's research. They found
that when the identity of the lowest costs avoider was determined ex post, and not
ex ante, then both parties face a probabilistic distribution as to potential judgment
and damages. See Schfifer & Mfiller-Langer, supra note 168, at 11.
225. And might not the operator of the offshore methane hydrate project be that
foreseeable least cost avoider of most if not all of the harms and hazards from its
own operations?
226. See id.
227. See Schfifer & Schonenberger, supra note 159, at 606. For the case of over-
engagement under a negligence rule, they cite to A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict Lia-
bility Versus Negligence in a Market Setting (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, Inc, Working Paper No. 0420, 1980); for under-engagement under a strict
liability rule, they cite to Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 164.
228. Strict liability requires the tortfeasor to bear all of the costs, so tortfeasors
have stronger incentives to ensure the net positive worth of their activities. Under
negligence, the tortfeasor will escape some of the consequences and costs of his ac-
tions so long as he meets his duty of care. See Schfifer & Schdnenberger, supra
note 159, at 606.
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bility provides a mechanism that can ensure that such activities are
undertaken only when the net costs and benefits of that activity are
net positive for both the tortfeasor and society at large. The negli-
gence rule would enable excessive amounts of that abnormally ha-
zardous activity. Thus, under Schifer's, et al., arguments strict
liability is a superior rule to ensure net positive results for the broader
community from the abnormally hazardous activity.
4.2.2 Landes Posner strict liability conditions
Landes and Posner provided an approach was similar to Shavell's
analysis of stranger-stranger bilateral accidents. 229 Their approach
also reflects Shavell's observation that while strict liability or negli-
gence may fail to be fully efficient under bilateral conditions, that
strict liability would be more effective at altering tortfeasor beha-
vior.2
30
Landes and Posner's conditions of strict liability do provide guid-
ance as to both the character of abnormally hazardous activities. 2
3 1
They state that an abnormally hazardous activity poses high expected
costs in injury and that additional levels of care will be ineffective in
reducing the probability of risk. They also focus the effort to alter
the tortfeasor's behaviors while assuming that the potential victims'
activities either cannot be changed or should not be changed.
Landes and Posner advised the rule of strict liability scenarios that
presented the combination of expensive injuries, inability to reduce
risk through additional care, the impossibility to control the activities
of potential victims and the primary goal to limit dangers by effi-
ciently controlling the overall level of the tortfeasor's engagement in
the abnormally hazardous activity.
232
229. See Shavell, supra note 164, at 18
230. See Proposition 4, that "strict liability is superior to the negligence rule if it
is sufficiently important to lower tortfeasor activity levels." See id. at 19.
231. See Faure, supra note 154, at 37 (citing Landes & Posner, supra note 172).
232. Id. The listed items were: (i) high expected accident costs, (ii) the impossi-
bility that more care by the tortfeasor would reduce accident risk, (iii) the impracti-
cability to constrain the victim's activity in flavor of the tortfeasor, and (iv) the
desirability to reduce the risk by an activity level change of the tortfeasor.
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4.2.3 Disproportionate risks to benefits
Expanding upon the ratio of externalized costs and benefits to the
victims, Hylton's model provided a strong basis for the application of
strict liability if the underlying activity displayed disproportionate ex-
ternalized risks of harm without counter-balancing externalized bene-
fits to the community. 233 Abnormally hazardous activities, by their
very definition, are likely to qualify to be governed by strict liability.
Hylton took his observations on the cross effects of externalized
costs and benefits to provide a comparative risk analysis that fore-
casts when which civil liability rules would be efficiently applied or
at least more robust.234 Noting that more risk reduces the optimal le-
vels of an activity but that the reverse is true for externalized bene-
fits, Hylton observed the rule paradigms of strict liability and
negligence provided offsetting and balancing results.235
Under strict liability, the more externalized risk there is, the more
damages will be assigned to the actor based upon his own activity
236level. But under negligence, the actor will have an incentive to re-
duce his activity in response to the risks externalized by other ac-
tors.23 7
This led Hylton to propose the following two propositions: 238
Proposition 1:
If qA > qB, holding A strictly liable is preferable to using
the negligence rule in regulating the activity level of A. If,
however, qA < qB, strict liability is not preferable to negli-
gence. In simpler terms, if A externalizes more risk to oth-
ers than they externalize to him, strict liability is preferable
233. Hylton differed from the above analysis in the case where external benefits
from the abnormally hazardous activity coincided with abnormally large benefits to
the potential victims; in that case he suggested that application of a negligence rule
might be more efficient. See Hylton, supra note 173, at 18-20.
234. See footnote 68, supra Section 4.2.1 (discussing Shavell's fourth proposi-
tion).
235. See Hylton, supra note 173, at 10.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. Hylton did not thusly label the propositions, so this labeling follows the se-
quence in which they were presented in the article.
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to negligence. However, if there is a reciprocal exchange
of risk between A and B, or if B externalizes more risk than
does A, holding A strictly liable is not preferable, as a me-
thod of regulating A's activity level choice, to the negli-
gence rule.23 9 (Underscoring added.)
Proposition 2:
If there is reciprocal exchange of risk between A and
(qA qB), strict liability and negligence provide the same
incentives for care and for activity level choices.240
These results provide simple guidance, that strict liability should
be used when the risk asymmetry is substantial; otherwise the negli-
241gence rule is at least equally efficient and potentially preferable.
Hylton summarized these results:
Where there is asymmetry in risk externalization, negligence caus-
es high risk-externalizers to increase their activity levels while low
risk-externalizers decrease their activity levels.242
A negligence rule faced with asymmetrical externalization of risks
results in more extreme behavior from the actors than comparatively
under a rule of strict liability. The risky actors engage in higher le-
vels of activity, the less risky actors engage in lower levels of activi-
ty.
4.3 Strict liability enables decentralization
Decentralization occurs when each tortfeasor can determine his
level of preventative activities based on his unique costs; tortfeasors
239. See id. at 11.
240. See id.
241. When the tortfeasor is singular but the victims many, the choice of civil lia-
bility rule may have a second criteria of risk-neutrality versus risk aversion. Nell
and Richter provided a demonstration that risk neutrality provides equivalent
choice-of-rule results for both abstract singular victim and multiple-count victims
but models with risk aversion have distinguishable results for singular victim ver-
sus multiple-count victims. They provided a proof that the optimal level of care in-
creases, in risk aversion models, as the number of potential victims is increased in
total head-count. See Nell & Richter, supra note 175, at 35.
242. See Hylton, supra note 173, at 12.
[VOL. XXVI
FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
are not identical in that they might face different technology and cost
choices. 243 Decentralization enables each tortfeasor to separately and
uniquely optimize their due care and activity level decisions based on
their own unique circumstances, thus this enables each tortfeasor to
set their own standards to achieve the optimal levels of precaution
and activity level.
The availability of decentralization is certain under strict liability
but under negligence decentralization only becomes available under
certain additional rules. Strict liability places the full risk of the pre-
cautionary level decision with the tortfeasor with no outside deter-
mined imposition of precaution costs. Thus, the tortfeasor can
coordinate his costs to his precautionary activities and thus achieve
decentralization.244
Negligence requires the tortfeasor to meet a certain minimal level
of care, the reasonable man standard, regardless of a tortfeasor's
unique costs to achieve that level of care. Variations to the stan-
dard negligence rule can provide for decentralization.246 The appli-
cation of both partial liability and a "highest degree of care" standard
can effectively provide full self-selection of tortfeasors to enable de-
247centralization. Kahan demonstrated that partial liability or use of
the difference principle can provide decentralization under negli-
gence; especially when the tortfeasor faces high per unit costs of
care. 248 In response to Kahan, Miceli proposed to establish due carelevels at the efficient due care level of the least cost of care tortfea-
243. Tortfeasors likely face different costs of care; decentralization is the policy
goal to enable each actor to set their own individualized efficient levels of activity
and precaution versus requiring them to meet community-wide standardized levels.
244. See Schfifer & Maller-Langer, supra note 168, at 18.
245. Negligence posits a reasonable man standard, but the results of that standard
need be identical for all potential tortfeasors. Thus, negligence inherently makes it
more difficult to obtain decentralization.
246. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 375 (1987); Omri Bar-Gill & Oren Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for
Comparative Negligence, 5 AM. L & ECON. REv. 433 (2005); Thomas J. Miceli, On
Negligence Rules and Self-Selection, 2 REv. L. & ECON. 349 (2006).
247. See Schfifer & Maller-Langer, supra note 168, at 17-18; ROBERT COOTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 388 (Pearson Addison Wesley, 2004).
248. See id. at 17.
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sor, holding each tortfeasor to the "highest degree of vigilance, care
and precaution.,
249
4.4 In the face of uncertainties
4.4.1 Uncertain ex ante duty of care
When certain activities are new and they present novel risks, it can
be difficult to ascertain the potential harms and hazards and to accu-
rately determine ex ante the efficient duty of care or means of precau-
tions. In that uncertainty, Sh~ifer, et al., stated that strict liability
would remain as efficient as it was with well-established activities, as
the rule of strict liability never required a duty of care for its efficient
250
operation.
Sh~ifer, et al., contrasted the efficiency of strict liability under un-
certainty against the difficulty faced by the rule of negligence in
similar circumstances. Negligence, in requiring a probabilistic inter-
pretation of the duty of care, could drive tortfeasors to inefficiently
251
over- or under-comply against the unknown duty of care.
4.4.2 Incentives for safety innovation
Additionally, with novel activities and uncertain risks, policy mak-
ers might want to consider which rule better provides incentives to
reduce the likelihood of future injuries. Under a rule of strict liabili-
ty, because the tortfeasor has to bear all of the costs of harm, the
search costs for safer alternatives fall to the tortfeasor.252
The rule of negligence is less effective in providing incentives for
safety innovation as the tortfeasor is only incentivized to reduce the
costs of reaching the established due care levels. Negligence pro-
vides a safety net for the tortfeasor, in that as long as certain estab-
249. See id. at 18 (citing to Miceli, supra note 253, who in turn was citing to
Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule,
J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1989)).
250. See Schfifer & Miller-Langer, supra note 168, at 26.
251. That said, Schfifer, et al., did caveat that efficiency might be obtained under
a negligence rule, just unreliably so. See id.
252. See Schfifer & Schonenberger, supra note 159, at 605. Especially relevant
for the case of complicated or exotic industrial technologies, strict liability imposes
the research costs upon the party mostly likely to find the answer, and to find that
answer at the lowest costs.
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lished historical norms are met, then no additional damages from
harms can be assessed against the tortfeasor.
4.4.3 Complex interactions of precaution and activity levels
Nussim and Tabbach noted that activity level might affect marginal
expected harm in non-linear ways; the marginal expected harm could
be either increased or decreased with additional levels of activity.
253
A rule of strict liability places the calculus of trade-offs solely with
the tortfeasor but a negligence rule requires a public manifestation of
a duty of care, which might be complicated and prohibitively costly
for legislators and judges. Nussim and Tabbach provided an analysis
that suggested that application of a negligence rule would result in a
duty of care in excess of the actually optimal duty of care, creating
inefficient results.
In their model, the social objective is the sum of the utility less the
costs of precaution and less the costs of harms and injuries to victims.
The model posits a condition that marginal investment in precaution
is met by the marginal reduction in accident costs. Also, the margin-
al costs of increasing the activity level equal the marginal social costs
of additional activity. These are impacted by their interdependen-
cy.254
Certain behavioral options can be identified within this framework.
First, consider the case of specialization, wherein exposure to a risky
255activity decreases the marginal costs of precaution. The result is
that precaution and activity are complements. Second, fatigue could
cause the costs of precaution to increase with activity levels; thus in-
creases in either activity level or in precaution increase the costs of
256precaution. When the fatigue effect is strong, then precaution and
activity levels become substitutes.257
Nussim and Tabbach found that for the negligence rule, this com-
plexity provides an unexpected result; when faced with high costs of
253. See Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172, at 170.
254. In their model, the cross effects are described as:
2j (xz) - Cxz(x,z) - hxz(x,z). This relationship can be contrasted with the
•2
Shavell and Landes Posner models' assumption that ' z - 0. See id. at 171.2x5Z
255. As formulated: cxz(x, z) < 0. See id.
256. As formulated: Crxd, z) > 0. See id0
257. The input of either reduces the other, ceteris paribus: LLLL < 0.J-X-J- < 0
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ascertaining the effects of interdependency on resultant activity level
and undertaken precautions, legislators and judges should set the val-
ue of due care higher than the otherwise established efficient level of
care. 258 Legislators and judges cannot simply determine the activity
level by setting a simple due care level, in that interdependency ef-
fects will require a simultaneous solution to both activity level and
level of care.259
In some sense, this is captured by the idea of jointly permitting cer-
tain activity levels and safety standards within an environmental reg-
ulatory setting; as such, to the extent that regulatory means can better
combine these two targets than civil liability might, regulatory means
would be preferable. But much of the information needed to make
such determinations is hidden or costly.
4.5 When transaction costs ofjustice are critical
In an extension of the logic but not the result of Shavell's earlier
arguments, Sch~ifer et al. demonstrated that strict liability would like-
ly present fewer cases to the courts than negligence would. Further,
once in court, the costs of litigating under a rule of strict liability are
expected to be less than the costs of litigating under a rule of negli-
gence. Thus, when the transaction costs of preserving rights afforded
under the rules of civil liability are of concern, the rule of strict liabil-
ity is preferable to a rule of negligence.
Shavell had argued that under a rule of negligence, the tortfeasor
would be likely to meet his duty of care and thus not be held liable
and ergo no suits would be brought by the victim; also, because it
was less costly to litigate under strict liability more claims would be
brought forward; that negligence increased the transaction costs of li-
tigating and thus provided an incentive to avoid litigation, whereas
strict liability with its lack of a duty of care rule would be less costly
and provide an incentive to litigate anytime the expected payoff from
258. At some x > x*. See id.
259. See id. at 172. In some sense, this is captured by the idea of jointly permit-
ing certain activity levels and safety standards within an environmental regulatory
setting; as such, to the extent that regulatory means can better combine these two
targets than civil liability might, regulatory means would be preferable.
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litigation was higher than the costs of filing.260 Additionally, strict
liability requires less information to be presented to the court than a
rule of negligence would require, because strict liability does not re-
quire a finding of both the existence or setting level of a prescribed
duty of care and whether that duty was in fact met by the tortfea-
261
sor
Schifer et al. suggested that the overall simplicity of the strict lia-
bility rule, which drove the lower costs identified by Shavell, should
actually encourage tortfeasors to settle out of court if the facts of
262harm are readily apparent. Additionally, when litigation costs are
considered, because errant courts will bear substantial transaction
costs, the optimal rule may not necessarily be foreseeable ex ante but
a strict liability rule is expected to be less costly.
263
There are three impact factors. First, because victims bear more
costs to litigate under a negligence rule, as they have more to estab-
lish in court, they will initiate less litigation that those victims facing
264
a strict liability rule. Second, because the law of strict liability is
both simpler, in that no causation need be developed nor any level of
care be established, the legal consequences are more readily foresee-
able. 2 6 5 Third, this foreseeability will lead to more pre-trial settle-
ments, enabling lost cost transference of wealth from tortfeasor to
victim.
266
260. S. Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357 (1984). See Schfifer & Schonenberger, supra note 159, at 604 (citing
Shavell, ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 150, at 264).
261. Michael G. Faure, Regulatory Strategies in Environmental Liability, in THE
REGULATORY FUNCTION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 129, 137 (Fabrizio Cafaggi,
Horatia Muir Watt, eds., Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011). See also Michael G.
Faure, Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment, (Maastricht Faculty
of Law, Working Paper No. 2008-7, 2008), available at
http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c fnabstract id- 1290523.
262. Ie., if it is cheaper because it is obvious, then rational litigators would also
expect the courts to render foreseeable judgments and thus preempt the need for ac-
tual litigation, leading to pre-trial settlements. As a result, those cases brought to
court under strict liability are most likely to be cases wherein the parties have di-
vergent views as to the extent or scale of the harms received by the victim. See
Schfifer & Schdnenberger, supra note 159, at 604.
263. See Schfifer & Muller-Langer, supra note 168, at 16.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id.
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If lawsuits based in rules of civil liability were to reach adjudica-
tion, the costs presented by litigation under a rule of strict liability
will be less than those costs posed by litigation under a rule of negli-
gence. Courts will have fewer tasks to accomplish in adjudication
under strict liability because they will only need to determine the
scale of the harms.267 Under negligence, courts need to prove negli-
gence by establishing both a duty of care rule and then an evidentiary
hearing on whether that duty was met, such a process can face high
transaction costs. 268 Thus, the overall costs of resolving conflicts un-
der a negligence rule would be expected to run higher than under a
strict liability system.269
4.6 Arguments for applying strict liability to offshore methane
hydrates
Given the scenarios wherein strict liability would be expected to be
more efficient or robust than negligence, as discussed supra, an
analysis can be undertaken to evaluate the unique facts and circum-
stances of offshore methane hydrates under those scenarios. That
analysis will reveal that a rule of strict liability well matches the cir-
cumstances of offshore methane hydrates.
4.6.1 The unilateral character of offshore methane hydrate projects
As stated in section 4.1, immediately supra, the major harms and
hazards of methane hydrate projects are reasonably described as un-
ilateral in nature.
Offshore methane hydrates would be generally located at sea re-
moved from direct or normal interactions with onshore communities.
The few potential interactions for potential victims to interact with
the operational or hazardous areas of the hydrate fields would primar-
ily be limited to surface craft crossing the field at water level. The
vast majority of offshore methane hydrate fields lay beyond routine
267. Clearly both forms of adjudication would also require several findings, such
as causation, but as those matters would be common to both they would not pro-
vide for substantial cost differences, even if the nuances of the issues were distin-
guishable between the two rules. E.g., establishment of causation might be
somewhat different under strict liability and under negligence, but the similarity of
the task overweighs the potential differences.
268. See Schfifer & Schonenberger, supra note 159, at 604.
269. See id.
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shoreline tourist activities and deep below routine skin or scuba di-
ving activities. The main opportunity for accidental overlap and con-
tributory risky acts from victims might be either commercial fishing
that dredges nets too close to the mud layers or interferes with gather-
ing lines or subsea mining operations; but those risks are routinely
addressed within existing offshore installations and are not known to
have created any major accidental events.27 °
The primary risks are technologically, geologically, and operation-
ally under the primary and likely sole control of the operator and its
joint venturers and subcontractors; the opportunity for bilateral acci-
dents is fairly limited.271 As such, the commercial development of
offshore methane hydrate primarily presents accidents and hazards of
a unilateral character. The rule of strict liability has repeatedly been
found to be superior to the rule of negligence in governing unilateral
accidents, thus strict liability should be applied to the governance of
offshore methane hydrate installations and operations.
4.6.2 Governing abnormally hazardous activities
There are reasonable arguments that the development and opera-
tion of methane hydrate extraction installations could be seen as ab-
normally hazardous activities. First, a review of Shavell's Ultra-
272Hazardous Strict Liability Rule is developed, followed by a review
of the Landes-Posner conditions for strict liability.
Shavell found that strict liability should be chosen as the rule of
civil liability if (i) the underlying activities are uniquely identifiable,
(ii) if the activity is worth controlling due to its imposition of non-
negligible risks upon non-participant victims, and (iii) if the victim's
engagement with the risky activity is entirely normal and thus "ac-
tivity that cannot and should not be controlled.,
273
270. But both of those activities can be reasonably engaged with by the operator
to alert those actors to the potential risks that they would be entering into should
they draw too near. Indeed, one might readily assume that the operator would bear
a certain responsibility under either rule of civil liability to ensure that trespassers
are safely intercepted prior to any potential to disrupt safe operations.
271. This particular analysis excludes events such as warfare or terrorism where-
in the act against the safety and stability of the hydrate field is intentional and deli-
berate.
272. See discussion on point, supra Section 4.2.
273. See supra Section 4.2.
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Methane hydrate installations are clearly uniquely identifiable from
other activities; they will be distinctive from both other forms of hy-
drocarbon extraction and of other offshore activities. Methane hy-
drates projects would pose non-negligible risks onto non-participants;
thus such activity is potentially worth controlling. 274 Most victims
would have no awareness of their interaction with the activities of the
methane hydrate project other than that it exists and operates, the vic-
tims essentially do none other than maintain the lives they enjoyed
prior to the onset of methane hydrate extraction activities. Thus ele-
ments (i) and (iii) are clearly met, but element (ii) is only partially
met. Shavell's model requires clarification on the issue of when does
an activity merit control and when should that control be in the form
of civil liability rules. However, one can reasonably infer that Sha-
vell would have seen the potential for methane venting and subsea
landslides as items worth controlling. Thus, all three elements would
likely be seen as met, and Shavell's ultra-hazardous rule would advo-
cate for strict liability for offshore methane hydrate projects.
The Landes-Posner conditions for strict liability require the satis-
faction of four elements; strict liability should govern the activity:
i. if the expected accidents costs are large,
ii. if it is impossible for the risk of the accident to be reduced
by additional precaution by the tortfeasor,
iii. if it is impractical to alter the behavior of the victim in fa-
vor of the tortfeasor, and
iv. if it is desirable to reduce risk by affecting the activity level
of the tortfeasor.275
The potential harms from subsea landslides, offshore tsunamis, and
potential environmental harms from methane and other emissions
could certainly be costly. Both non-cataclysmic and cataclysmic ac-
cidents could pose massive discomforts and loss of livelihoods, loss
of property, and potential injuries or deaths to humans, fauna, and
flora. The first aspect of the Landes-Posner conditions would likely
be met in offshore methane hydrate accidents.
274. Somewhat adverse to Shavell's position, it is not a logical requirement that
such spill-over risk mandates the imposition of social controls; Hylton's model
provides a richer discussion on point.
275. See supra discussion, at Section 4.2.1.
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It is not as clear that additional precautions would not affect the
overall risk levels; given technological developments and on-going
refinements to operational standards, one might assume that risks
could be reduced. However, safety planners have to be responsive to
the technologies and realities presented to them within their window
of operational control, which be quarterly or annually measured.
They will face fixed points of technology, budgets, and human and
capital resources from which to optimize their accident management
plans. As such, it is arguable that additional precautions would not
be feasible once the initial plans are developed; while safety im-
provements might become available in future time periods they
would be irrelevant for the prevention of accidents within the deci-
sion maker's timeframe. Thus, arguendo, the second aspect of the
Landes-Posner conditions would be met in offshore methane hydrate
accidents.
As argued in the previous paragraph, the victims have next to no
interaction with the installations thus a certain policy goal would be
to protect the daily lives and routines of the potential victims as much
as possible. The third aspect of the Landes-Posner conditions would
likely be met in offshore methane hydrate accidents.
Finally, it is not clear that merely reducing the activity levels of the
methane hydrate operator is a socially beneficial agenda; the com-
mercial operation of methane hydrate fields could be potentially of
much social value. However, there are many potential vectors within
which the activity levels of certain parties or at certain locations
should be curtailed by economic incentives. E.g., certain fields
would present higher levels of risks than other fields; incentives
should be provided to encourage operators to prefer the safer me-
thane hydrate deposits. E.g., certain operators would be more techni-
cally, scientifically, and financially capable of safely managing
offshore methane hydrate operations; incentives should be motivated
to prevent incompetent operators from engaging in this industry. As
such, while the commercial development of offshore methane hy-
drate might avail of broad benefits to the general public, many vec-
tors of its implementation could be severely adverse to the general
public and thus public policy would likely want to govern the activity
level in those sectors of the industry. As such, the fourth aspect of
the Landes-Posner conditions would likely be met in offshore me-
thane hydrate accidents. Given that all four conditions of the Landes-
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Posner test have been readily met, strict liability would be advised for
the development of offshore methane hydrates.
4.6.3 Achieving decentralization
The ability to achieve decentralization is a key concern; as dis-
cussed, supra,276 strict liability efficiently enables decentralization.
Decentralization is the ability of each tortfeasor to make their own
unique determination of how to attain the optimal levels of activity
and precaution whilst observing their own private costs to attain
those goals. Decentralization enables each tortfeasor to coordinate
their private costs efficiently without the need to match an exogen-
ously determined standard. Multiple researchers have presented
models that suggest a rule of negligence often fails to obtain decen-
tralization whereas a rule of strict liability more robustly does obtain
it277
Decentralization has been demonstrated to be obtainable under cer-
tain versions of negligence. Miceli demonstrated that by carefully
setting the duty of care to a high level, to that of the least cost of care
278tortfeasor, then the highest degree of "vigilance, care and precau-
tion" could be attained alongside decentralization. Similar require-
ments could be set for rules applicable to methane hydrate extraction
operations. Miceli's methods also address the concerns that only un-
der strict liability would a tortfeasor spend an efficient amount in
1 279Thsthchiefraulsearch of precautionary technologies. Thus, the choice for a rule
of negligence need not prevent the attainment of decentralization in
governing accidents resultant from methane hydrate accidents.
However, Miceli's requirements to set the standard duty of care at
the level of that "least cost of care tortfeasor" would likely require
276. See supra discussion, at Section 4.3.
277. See supra discussion, at Section 4.3.
278. By setting the due care level with regard to that of the tortfeasor with lowest
costs of precaution, Miceli has accomplished two items. First, he has created a
market for operators to seek cost efficiencies in precaution, making more precau-
tion more affordable. One assumes that the party with the lowest costs of precau-
tion must, ceteris paribus, be in possession of the most efficient precaution
technology, and thus, Miceli's rule provides for the least waste in achieving the du-
ty of care. See Miceli, supra note 253, enpassim.
279. See supra discussion, at Section 4.4.2. See also Schfifer & Schonenberger,
supra note 159, at 605.
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knowledge not available ex ante to initial accidents and litigation or
prior to the development of an information obtaining regulatory
framework. Making no argument here that such a regulatory frame-
work is not also a public good; it suffices to say that strict liability
would efficiently obtain decentralization prior to those collections of
data by regulatory fiat.
The onset of offshore methane hydrate operations will arrive with a
host of new technologies and expertises that will for the most part be
managed as intellectual property and as operational trade secrets
based on in-house experiences. Each methane hydrate operator
would likely face substantially different safety functions and decen-
tralization would be a valuable policy attainment. As strict liability is
widely held as more robust in supporting decentralization, it should
be preferable to negligence. Considering that decentralization is rea-
dily and efficiently attained under strict liability, variants of negli-
gence should not be preferred to it without additional reasons to
avoid strict liability being noted.
4.6.4 Handling uncertain ex ante duty of care
Sch~ifer et al. suggested that a rule of strict liability would be pre-
ferable to a rule of negligence when the duty of care is not ex ante
clearly observable by the tortfeasor; 280 if the values are hidden then
they cannot be accurately included in decision-making.
In the case of a nascent industry such as methane hydrates, it is
likely that barring extra measures the eventual duty of care could be
obscure ex ante.281 As such, the logical conclusion is that strict lia-
bility might be preferable to negligence at least until a consensus de-
veloped to establish a clear determination of what duty of care would
be employed by a negligence rule and thus make a clear ex ante duty
feasible.
However, one finds it unlikely that an industry such as methane
hydrate exploitation would be capable of reaching development
without some form of regulation. A longer discussion of the ex-
280. See supra discussion, at Section 4.4.1.
281. However, the duty of care could be clarified and established ex ante by sev-
eral means. The most direct means would be to buttress the application of negli-
gence with regulations that provide guidance as to required duties of care and
precaution. Industrial groups could agree to certain industry wide standards of
care.
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pected application of regulation to offshore methane hydrates is
found, infra, at Section 3.
Offshore methane hydrates will be found in government owned or
administrated waters and as national assets the hydrates would likely
face some form of regulation with regards to waste prevention and
safe extraction. Most countries would likely require some form of
permit process to produce those hydrates from their jurisdictional wa-
ters and this licensing process would itself likely be subject to regula-
tion; e.g., such regulations often require filing of EIAs and contingent
emergency plans by the prospective operators. There are many rea-
sons to expect that the extraction of most hydrates would come under
several forms of regulation. Given the variety of regulations that off-
282shore methane hydrates would likely engage, and the need of vari-
ous regulatory bodies to respond to the circumstances of offshore
methane hydrates, that it is unlikely that offshore methane hydrates
could move into development without ex ante standards being regula-
torily established ahead of initial licensing and development activi-
ties.
In conclusion, while the theoretical advantage is probably given to
the choice of strict liability, the underlying problem of an uncertain
ex ante duty of care is not likely to be a substantial problem due to
the coincidental development of regulations as the onset of methane
hydrate exploitation approached.
4.6.5 Provide incentives for safety innovations
There is an established argument that strict liability provides better
incentives to the tortfeasor to develop safety and precautionary tech-
nology because the rule places all of the costs of harm at the tortfea-
sor's feet.283
In the case of methane hydrates this is doubly likely to be effective,
as few parties beyond the operators would have access to the relevant
technologies, to the fields and activities in question, and to the opera-
tion awareness of encountered risks. Those operators will also have
pre-existing financial capacities to develop such technologies in ad-
282. For a more complete discussion, see Roy A. Partain, A Comparative Legal
Approach for the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Existing Laws and Conven-
tions, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. (forthcoming January 2015).
283. See supra discussion, at Section 4.1.
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vance of development and production and would also be recipient of
the revenues from methane sales from the installations to provide fu-
ture funding of safety and precautionary technologies. While coordi-
nation with universities, government institutes, and local
communities should be fostered, the effective development of the re-
quired safety and precautionary technologies will likely need the
leadership and cooperation of the operators.
Thus both from a practical and a theoretical perspective, it is quite
advisable to employ a rule of strict liability to best create the incen-
tives that would result in the most sure development of safety and
precautionary technologies.
4.6.6 Preventing victim coordination problems
Sch~ifer et al. raised a concern that when there are too many plain-
tiff victims, that interactive due care between the victims leads to
problems of victims raising each other's risk levels; by choosing a
rule of strict liability such a problem can be prevented.284
In the case of methane hydrate projects, the scale of "too many vic-
tims" reaches another level of analysis, that of the potential efficien-
cy of public regulations over the basic efficiency of any rule of civil
liability due to the larger potential number of victims. 285 However,
as will be argued infra,286 the preferred solution would be a combina-
tion of a rule of strict liability alongside public regulations.
4.6.7 Minimizing the costs of justice
Civil liability rules need to be enforced by courts, but such efforts
incur substantial transaction costs. Due process, discovery, and the
costs of trial are all non-trivial, even in the best of circumstances.
Models demonstrate that strict liability is more robust than negli-
gence because it is foreseeable that strict liability could result in a
higher percentage of pre-trial settlements and also that the rule of
strict liability present simpler cases to litigate. Thus, strict liability is
preferable if the transaction costs of the administration of justice are
of material concern.
284. See supra discussion, at Section 4.4.
285. See infra discussion, at Section 6.3.
286. See infra discussion, at Section 6.3.
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For offshore methane hydrate projects operating in developed
countries, this may not present as large a concern as it might to those
projects located offshore of countries with weak or developing legal
institutions. Thus, those jurisdictions might well benefit from the ap-
plication of strict liability.
But even in developed settings, the ability of community represen-
tatives to obtain justice might be challenged if they need compete
against the resources of large methane hydrate operators. In those
countries with weak or developing legal institutions, both the opera-
tors and various community representatives might find the legal insti-
tutions poorly suited to the litigious needs of major methane hydrate
accidents. Especially for that scenario, the goal should be to facili-
tate the reliability and stability of access to justice for all parties. Be-
cause the standard models demonstrate that a rule of strict liability
places less stress, or transaction costs, on the local justice system,
strict liability should be applied in those conditions.287
5. WHEN NEGLIGENCE IS PREFERABLE
As noted in the first section of this study, there are a large number
of arguments in favor of the application of strict liability. As stated
by Sch~ifer and Mtiller-Langer, "the strict liability rule, therefore,
seems to dominate the negligence rule in terms of giving the right in-
,,288centives.
Yet, Sch~ifer and Mtiller-Langer also noted that most of the legal
traditions in the world display a preference for negligence rules over
strict liability.2 89 Civil law nations have negligence as the general
rule and common law countries assume a default of negligence for
any risky activities unless previously assigned to strict liability or
other specific torts.290 Civil law nations provide specific enactments
for when strict liability is to be applied and common law countries
287. See supra discussion, at Section 4.5.
288. See Schfifer & Maller-Langer, supra note 168, at 18.
289. See id.
290. See id.
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generally reserve strict liability for abnormally dangerous activi-
ties.291
This divergence between theoretical expectations of strict liability
and real-world application of negligence rules has led researchers to
find rational models of when negligence would be rationally prefera-
ble. Many of these results are obtained by the weakening of the sim-
plifications of the standard models. It broadly appears that judicial
error, transactions costs, information searches, and ultimately the de-
sire to not prevent those risky activities with broad welfare benefits
from over-deterrence lead policy makers to apply negligence rules.
First, the standard model follows the normal economic assump-
tions of rationality and financial capacity to respond to economic
events. Once the problems of risk aversion, risk allocation or incom-
plete insurance are added to the standard model, the negligence rule
becomes more robust than strict liability. Similar results avail if the
tortfeasor would be unable to pay or unwilling to pay the due damag-
292es by means of insolvency or avoidance strategies.
Second, the standard model assumed that the courts were able, un-
der both strict liability and negligence rules, to return accurate judg-
ments and damages. When that assumption is relaxed, that
judgments and damages might be errant, then negligence has been
found to be more robust than strict liability.293
Third, both the actors to the risky activity and the courts called to
judge on the resultant harms need access to complete and accurate in-
formation. The standard model assumes as much. When critical in-
formation is missing, negligence has been suggested as more fit to
provide that data than strict liability.
294
Fourth, even though an activity might display high risks and costly
externalized hazards, if those risks and hazards are symmetrical to
their externalized benefits to public welfare, then it might be in the
interest of the community to support a higher level of activity to ob-
tain those externalized benefits. As seen in earlier discussions of bi-
lateral accidents, a negligence rule would better enable higher levels
291. See id. See also the United States Restatement (2nd) on Torts for a demon-
stration of the limited historical application of strict liability. The Restatement is
currently in process to the 3rd edition.
292. See discussion, infra Section 5.1.
293. See discussion, infra Section 5.2.
294. See discussion, infra Section 5.3.
2015]
278 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
of activity at a due level of care than a rule of strict liability would
enable.295
While the character of offshore methane hydrate operations might
include certain aspects of these conditions, it is not clear that these
circumstances would make a compelling argument to reverse the
strength of the previous arguments for the application of strict liabili-
ty for that industry.
Risk aversion is not the same behavior as risk recognition; while
longtime operators in oil and gas ventures surely have recognized the
potential hazards of their industries they do for the most part remain
296engaged in those hazardous activities. Thus, it would be difficult
to make a prima facie case that the likely operators of offshore me-
thane hydrate installations would be rationally hindered by risk aver-
sion or like concerns.
The chance of court error is more likely that the previous concern.
The potential harms and hazards of offshore methane hydrate acci-
dents would likely be both complicated and widespread; the technol-
ogical issues would also be plentiful. However, courts have
responded reasonably to other large environmental accidents; if there
were to be unique problems due to the character of cataclysmic me-
thane hydrate accidents those problems might in turn be more proper-
ly addressed by regulation than civil liability. 297
Would there be sufficient information on the risks, precaution
costs, and potential hazards both ex ante to make correct decisions
and ex post to sustain accurate judgments; one assumes that there
could always be more information. However, much of the evolving
science and engineering preceding the commercial development of
offshore methane hydrates has in fact been conducted conjointly with
multiple national governmental agencies or otherwise published
through peer-reviewed scientific and engineering journals. While
surely some amount of private in-house technology and operation
295. See discussion, infra Section 5.4.
296. Indeed, a res ipsa loquitur argument might well be made that if those oil
and gas operators are aware of the hazards and have remained engaged, then likely
they have found solutions to those risks such as insurance, self-insurance, safety
planning and a variety of other means. Indeed, one of the earliest messages sent by
BP in the wake of the Macondo incident was to reassure their investors of their in-
tent to recover and continue in the industry.
297. This avenue of accident governance is directly addressed in Section 6.3.
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procedures could be reasonably assumed, there is little or no reason
to expect a significant enough data failure to prevent civil rules from
functioning properly, for either negligence or strict liability.
Finally, the onset of commercial development of offshore methane
hydrates will surely externalize accidental risks, but will it external-
ize potential public welfare benefits? While the benefits of offshore
methane hydrates were enumerated in Section 2, one would likely as-
sume that those benefits would not be received without some form of
economic payment. E.g., it unlikely that one might obtain electrical
power or methane fuel without paying for it. Likewise, while CCS
storage within the hydrate deposit might not have a direct billing to
the local community, it is likely that either their taxes or their elec-
trical bills might contain the costs of that service. Thus, it is not clear
that these types of benefits would qualify as formal externalities. 298
A demonstrated lack of externalized benefits but a clear presence of
risks is traditional grounds for a rule of strict liability; all of the major
models reviewed in this study would concur. Thus, if a rule of negli-
gence were to be applied, it would be in want of proof of externalized
public benefits.
But even if such externalized public benefits were to be estab-
lished, a strong argument can be made that the accidents likely to re-
sult from methane hydrate operations are more properly characterized
as unilateral and thus better governed with strict liability. And in the
alternative, while the commercial and energy supply benefits might
be readily demonstrated, just as surely some members of the public
might be concerned about potential climate change impacts or cata-
clysmic accidents to an extent that they would advocate that the po-
tential externalized risks might outweigh the externalized benefits,
and thus deem the ratio of risks to benefits more in line with the ap-
plication of a rule of strict liability.
5.1 Imperfect tortfeasors
5.1.1 Actors with risk aversion or incomplete insurance
The standard models of accident risk governance assumed risk
neutrality; this assumption is critical to the efficiency of strict liabili-
298. Israel Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap Between Private Loss
and Social Cost, 17 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 589 (1997).
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ty within the standard models. 299 Risk aversion was not generally in-
cluded in earlier accident models, such as in Shavell's unilateral and
bilateral models.30 0
Nell and Richter suggested that risk aversion could be added to the
standard models. 30 They provided a demonstration that the applica-
tion of risk aversion to unilateral accident models would break the
standard symmetry of both strict liability rules and negligence rules
to efficiently set precaution levels. 302 They provided two levels of
analysis: the first focused immediately on the risk adverse parties
and second on the insurance might play in such settings.
Nell and Richter found that for risk adverse actors, negligence was
more robust than strict liability. 303 In a simple model, the results
were completely divergent, with negligence being increasingly pre-
ferred as the number of potential victims increases.
In contrast, strict liability was found to be preferable only when
parties are risk neutral or when insurance is readily available, which
304in turn appears to require risk neutral insurance providers. When
the ideal terms for strict liability are not present, then strict liability
299. For a discussion on the connection between risk neutrality and the standard
models, see Michael G. Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, Competition on the Euro-
pean Market for Liability Insurance and Efficient Accident Law, 9 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & COMP. L. 279 (2002). See also A. Endres, & R. Schwarze,
Allokationswirkungen einer Umwelthaftpflicht-versicherung, in HAFTUNG UND
VERSICHERUNG FUR UMWELTSCHADEN AUS OKONOMISCHER UND JURISTISCHER
SICHT 58 (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1992).
300. See Nell & Richter, supra note 175, at 33.
301. Nell and Richter provide a list of reasons that corporate entities might be
risk averse: (i) corporate notions of risk aversion operate only for well-financed
diversified portfolio holders which is contrary to many investors both private and
public, (ii) even for such parties as qualify as well-diversified portfolio holders,
they can only achieve genuine risk neutrality if there is no system risk component
which might not be true for certain highly risky (investment) activities, (iii) there is
much evidence of structural imperfections in the capital market which could fru-
strate efforts to diversify risk, (iv) transaction costs tend to prevent portfolios from
being sufficiently diversified, (v) entrepreneurial decisions within firms are made
by risk averse humans who are guided by careful strategies to remain in employ-
ment and are often rewarded for conservative stewardship of capital, and (vi) those
same human managers will have the potential to display risk aversion or pessimism
against the risk of large losses. See id.
302. See id. at 33.
303. Seeid. at31.
304. See id. at 42.
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leads to insufficient activity levels.305 They found that when the
number of victims is sufficiently large, risk aversion can drive strict
liability to prevent otherwise socially beneficial activity from occur-
ring.306
They then modeled how the provision and impact of insurance af-
fected the parties risk allocation strategies. If insurance markets were
perfect, then tortfeasors and victims could both eliminate their risks
in exchange for purchasing insurance policies; but in the real world
liability insurance limits coverage to leave some risks with the pur-
chasers.30 7 The optimal amount of liability for the tortfeasor increas-
es as the amount of insurance becomes available; the intuition herein
is that if the tortfeasor can purchase insurance efficiently then it is
more efficient for social welfare for the risk to be moved from victim
to tortfeasor and onto the insurer, i.e. from the most risk averse to-
wards less risk averse parties. 3 8 But there is a limit, in that tortfea-
sors would not purchase a full amount of insurance so long as the
costs of the insurance include non-trivial loading fees, so coverage
will remain shy of the total exposure and the tortfeasor will continue
to bear less than full risk.309
The efficiency of loading is critical; as the loading fee becomes tri-
vial in cost, strict liability becomes more robust and as the loading
310fee become more expensive then negligence becomes more robust.
Ergo, the more costly it is to provide insurance, the more negligence
is preferable and the less costly insurance is the more strict liability is
preferable.
Given the result that insurance companies will charge for claims
and for loading fees, and that customer cum tortfeasors would not pay
for full coverage, neither strict liability nor negligence approximate
305. See id.
306. See id. at 43.
307. See id. at 40.
308. See id. at 41.
309. In the modeling terms presented by Nell and Richter: But there is a limit, in
that tortfeasors won't buy full insurance so long as there is a positive loading fee,
m > 0, so the level of coverage, d, will remain d < 1, and the of risk allocated to the
tortfeasor, q*, will not reach 1.
310. In the modeling terms presented by Nell and Richter: The efficiency of
loading is critical, as m - 0, strict liability becomes more robust and as m, diverges
from zero negligence becomes more robust. See Nell & Richter, supra note 175, at
42.
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the optimal solution."' However, there is simply no convergence to
312the negligence rule as was seen above. Yet, at sufficiently high le-
vels of victims, the maximum level of care becomes optimal.313
Thus, negligence was found to be more robust than strict liability for
risk adverse tortfeasors with incomplete insurance options when the
number of victims is large or when the insurers themselves are risk
314averse.
Nell and Richter found that when insurance is imperfectly provided
315then negligence is a superior rule. When insurance is costly to
purchase, as compared to expected pay-outs in claims, then negli-
gence is more robust. This is especially true when the cost of the in-
316surance is driven by the risk aversion of the insurer.
Friehe found a similar result when the number of potential victims
is large and insurance is provided.31 7
5.1.2 Insolvency
Shavell demonstrated that under insolvency constraints, strict lia-
bility was likely to provide incentives to the tortfeasor to undertake
insufficient precaution and over-engage in activity; thus, negligence
318
would be preferable.
When Nussim and Tabbach's 'durable precaution' model is ex-
tended to the insolvency problem, it develops a three-tier analysis, (i)
when the assets exceed the expected costs of damages, (ii) when they
equal them, and (iii) when the assets are less than the expected costs
of damages.
When the assets exceed the expected costs of damages, then there
are no effective constraints preventing the tortfeasor from choosing
optimal levels of activity and precaution. 31 9 However, if the margin-
311. See id.
312. See id. at 41.
313. See id. at 42.
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172, at 175 (citing to Steven Shavell,
The Judgment ProofProblem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 43 (1986)).
319. "Assets exceed the expected costs of damages" as formulated: > z*h. See
Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172, at 176.
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al utility to the tortfeasor of additional activity does not decline, as in
diminishing returns, then the tortfeasor is likely to pursue maximum
activity levels.32 °
When the assets are less than or equal to the expected costs of
321damages, then the tortfeasor would face declining marginal costs
of damages as the activity level increase; those costs are said to
"plummet to zero. 322 This drop in costs encourages the tortfeasor to
engage in the maximum level of activity. This has a secondary effect
on the precautionary level, which drops below the prescriptive level
of care, x <x *. 323
These results are roughly in alignment with Shavell's analysis on
insolvency, but they diverge from the incorrect estimation analyses
and thus clarify that the choice of civil liability rules need to take
these matters into separate account.
5.1.3 Strategic avoidance plus precaution
When tortfeasors can invest in both precaution and avoidance, neg-
ligence will outperform strict liability in unilateral accidents. 324
Once tortfeasors exercise avoidance strategies, strict liability be-
comes notably weaker than negligence.
When avoidance is highly effective, both strict liability and negli-
gence yield similar results, which that both rules produce precaution
325levels less than the socially optimal level. Negligence achieves
first-best performance in all ranges of the avoidance parameters, but
326strict liability can only do so in limited settings. As negligence is
320. See id.
321. "Assets are less than or equal to the expected costs of damages," as formu-
lated: A < z*h." See id. at 175.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See Friehe, supra note 173, at 216. Avoidance is defined as the efforts
made to reduce the likelihood of held responsible, not the avoidance of an accident
itself E.g., when a tortfeasor seeks legal advice to minimize consequences after
the accident occurs, that is an instance of avoidance. It is a wholly separate notion
from precaution, which is the avoidance of liability before the occurrence of an ac-
cident. -id.
325. See id. at 215, at Lemmas 1 and 2.
326. See id.
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socially less costly than strict liability, it is preferable when avoid-
ance is exercised.327
If the courts were to set their prescriptive due care level to the le-
vels that the avoidance-seeking tortfeasors self-selected, per the ar-
gument above, then the resultant overall social costs would become
lower than if the courts had pursued the naive328 notion of optimal
due care. 329 This is complex result that would require the summation
of the additional risks, and thus social costs, undertaken by the
avoidance-seeking tortfeasors and the social cost reductions enabled
by the lowered prescriptive duty of care; the net impact may be unfo-
reseeable.
5.1.4 Defects of optimism and pessimism
Behavioral economics affects the results of the liability rule mod-
els; negligence provides a more robust response in achieving effi-
ciency under these changes to the basic models. 330 Negligence
appears to be preferable primarily because it separates the decision
processes of the tortfeasor from the determination of the appropriate
level of precaution whereas strict liability would leave that determi-
nation with the tortfeasor who would be suffering from certain cogni-
tive biases.
Sch~ifer et al. posited that once certain emotional ambiguities of
optimism and pessimism are introduced that negligence leads to bet-
ter results than a rule of strict liability.33 1 Humans tend to be overly
optimistic about avoiding accidents or about environmental risks.
332
327. See idat Proposition 1.
328. Here naive refers to the model's level of due care as if no avoidance were
undertaken by the tortfeasors.
329. See Friehe, supra note 173, at 215, Proposition 2.
330. See Sch~ifer & Maller-Langer, supra note 168 at 24. Behavioral economics
posits, among other issues, that humans tend to deviate from rationality in predicta-
ble ways, thus rational models can be built from non-rational logic systems.
331. See id. at 25 (citing to Joshua C. Teitelbaum, A Unilateral Accident Model
Under Ambiguity, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (2007), with special reference for pes-
simism models).
332. See Sch~ifer & Muller-Langer, supra note 168 at 24 (citing to Andy Guppy,
Subjective Probability of Accident and Apprehension in Relation to Self-Other Bi-
as, Age, and Reported Behaviour, 25 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS PREVENTION 375
(1993), Cass R. Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
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In such optimism, the tortfeasor underestimates their expected harms
333to victims and thus enact a lower level of precaution. Under a
strict liability rule, this would see the tortfeasor misestimate the po-
tential impacts on victims and thus set a level of care below the effi-
cient level; on the other hand, a negligence rule would remain
unaffected and remain efficient as the standard of care is not set by
the tortfeasor's estimate of harms and damages and the tortfeasor's
behavior is unchanged by the optimism. 
334
Humans tend to be excessively pessimistic about catastrophic acci-
dents such as earthquakes; 335 excessive care will result. Excessive
care will result in certain inefficiency under strict liability, 336 whereas
negligence might be efficient in this setting.337 Again, the negligence
rule might be preferable because the determination of precaution is
set exogenous to the tortfeasor by the prescribed duty of care.
5.2 Imperfect or inaccurate damages
When inaccuracy of judgments in producing accurate sanctions is
introduced to the costs to be borne by the tortfeasor, the results on ef-
ficiency are markedly impacted. Negligence will not need the sanc-
tion to equal the harms caused, 338 but strict liability will need the
sanctions to equal the harms imposed in order to yield an optimal re-
(1998); and Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246
SCIENCE 1232 (1989)).
333. See Schfifer & Maller-Langer, supra note 168, at 24.
334. See id.
335. See id. (citing to Gerd Gigerenzer, The Law and Economics of Irrational
Behavior, in IS THE MIND IRRATIONAL OR ECOLOGICALLY RATIONAL? 37 (Stan-
ford, Stanford University Press, 2005); and to Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & R.
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471
(1998)).
336. See Schfifer & Maller-Langer, supra note 168, at 24.
337. Negligence has been observed to be inefficient, in the general case, because
the tortfeasor does not take into account the costs of damages when he meets the
prescribed duty of care. By setting his standard of care higher than the prescribed
rule, he might actually achieve an efficient result. See similar modeling effects
within Nussim and Tabbach's analysis of costly legislation.
338. See Schfifer & Schonenberger, supra note 159, at 605.
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sult.33 9 Strict liability loses its efficiency in the face of inaccurate
340damages.
34
Court errors are likely to frustrate efficient governance of accident
risks. 34  The incorrect estimation of damages affects both the strict
liability rule set and the negligence rule set. The incorrect estimation
of damages is believed to be a wide spread problem in the real
world.342 There are a variety of transaction costs problems that fru-
strate correct damage setting.343 Punitive damages attempt to correct
for some of those issues, but they are likewise frustrated by transac-
tion costs problems.344
E.g., in the case of a tortfeasor choosing to increase their care level
and to thus over-comply,345 the mechanical results are that the costs
of care are increased, the expected damages are decreased, and the
probability of being held liable for negligence also decreases. 346
Given this mix of directions in costs changes, it is difficult to forecast
what the tortfeasor would choose to do without the specific costs be-
339. See id.
340. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
See also L. T. Visscher, Tort Damages, in 1 TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS, ENCYC-
LOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 153, en passim (2d Ed., Michael G. Faure ed.,
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009),
341. Court errors do occur and must be taken into account. There are three pri-
mary listed sources for court errors: (i) error in determinations in the level of effi-
cient care, (ii) error in the assessments of an tortfeasor's actual rendered level of
care, and (iii) the parties own inabilities to monitor and render specific levels of
care continuously. See Schfifer & Mfiller-Langer, supra note 168, at 8.
342. See Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172, at 173.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 174.
345. The three sources of court errors have two effects on the efficiency of liabil-
ity rules; to over-comply or to under-comply. Over-compliance better ensures that
whatever the actually imposed level of care turns out to be that the tortfeasor met
that hurdle and will not bear the potentially larger costs of the harms rendered.
Under-compliance results from an awareness that errant courts might sometimes
render no judgment for damages despite the tortfeasor failing to meet the sanc-
tioned level of due care, thus it becomes irrational to always pay the costs for meet-
ing the sanctioned level of due care. See Schfifer & Mfiller-Langer, supra note 168,
at 8.
346. The mechanics of the decision process are determined by three factors; (i)
the impact on the costs of care, (ii) the expected damages, and (iii) the resultant
impact on being held liable for negligence. See Schfifer & Miller-Langer, supra
note 168, at 9.
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ing detailed; but it is most likely that either way the tortfeasor is not
likely to land on an efficient result.34
5.2.1 Complexity and strict liability
Strict liability did not provide sufficient incentives under imperfect
damages. Strict liability was found to be frustrated by interdepen-
dencies between the activity level and the level of precaution under-
taken; only under certain rare conditions did the rule provide any
certainty as to effect and under no certain case was efficiency found
by Nussim and Tabbach.348
When the judgment damages are expected to be too high, the tort-
feasor would enact over-precaution and become inefficient. Symme-
trically, when the expected judgment damages are too low, the
tortfeasor will behave with under-precaution and cause excessive ac-
cidents and harms.349
A rule of strict liability is not very robust when presented with in-
correctly estimated damages and interdependent activity and precau-
tion decisions. Within these requirements, stable forecasts of policy
setting for tortfeasors under rules of strict liability can be achieved
only within two narrow results. 350 All other results are left a mix of
up in one aspect and down in the other, making results mixed, all due
to the interdependency effects. The direct and indirect results of a
specific policy may well be in conflict, creating a lack of clear effect.
There is no efficient outcome under a strict liability rule, only inef-
ficient over or under compliance. 35 This is a rational, albeit ineffi-
cient, result of responding to errant court judgments.
347. See id.
348. Nussim & Tabbach at 174-175.
349. See Schfifer & Miiller-Langer, supra note 168, at 26.
350. If damages are overestimated, then both care and activity level will be in-
creased if and only if the elasticity of the probability of accidents given a level of
precaution exceeds the elasticity of the first derivative of the same. On the other
hand, overestimated damages will decrease both activity and precautions if and on-
ly if the elasticity of the first derivative of the utility function is less than unity. See
Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172, at 174.
351. m > 1 always leads to over-deterrence and m < 1 always leads to under-
deterrence. See Schfifer & Mfiller-Langer, supra note 168, at 9.
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5.2.2 Complexity and negligence
When the potential of the court system to render errant damages is
considered, the negligence rule can be more robust and retain its effi-
ciency in contrast to a less reliable strict liability rule.
352
Multiple studies found that for a tortfeasor under a negligence rule,
there are several foreseeable results.353 Under systematic overestima-
tion of damages, the tortfeasors would operate at the prescribed duty
of care level and at maximum levels of activity.354 Under systematic
underestimation of damages, the tortfeasors would face strategic
choices. 355 If the estimate error is small, then the tortfeasor will ex-
ercise due care, x*, and operate at maximum levels of activity.
356
The major exception to that finding was when extreme underestima-
tion of damages set the costs of liability below the costs of due care,
wherein the tortfeasor was expected to operate at below the level of
due care and at levels of activity lower than the maximum - in effect,
the tortfeasor would operate under a defacto rule of strict liability as
they would always be found liable because their duty of care was
unmet. 357
But even a negligence rule can become sufficiently complex as to
match strict liability's loss of efficiency. Sch~ifer and Mfiller-Langer
found that a negligence rule would function inefficiently when the er-
ror rate becomes extreme; either at very low or very high error
358
rates. Similarly, Nussim and Tabbach found that if the error were
significant enough, then the tortfeasor would exercise a lesser level
of care, i.e., below the prescribed duty of care and operate below
maximum levels of activity.
359
352. See id.
353. See id. at 26. See also Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172, at 174-175.
354. See id., at 174. An overestimate of damages costs reinforces the calculus to
avoid damages by operating at the due care level.
355. See id. at 174.
356. See id. at 174-175.
357. See id.
358. The error rate is defined as m e {0 < m < o}; wherein "zero error" would be
m - 1 and o is a very large positive real number. See Schfifer & Miiller-Langer,
supra note 168, at 9.
359. See Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172, at 174-175
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5.3 Need for data transparency
Negligence bears higher transaction costs, but those costs may
come with informational benefits. The Janus-nature of the aforemen-
tioned transaction costs of negligence is that they provide informa-
tion to the public to better inform them and the courts on the
efficient, and hence appropriate, duty of care.360
Strict liability enables a tortfeasor to make a private decision with
361
regards to precautionary efforts. The event of harm does not re-
quire any disclosure of information other than the detailing of the
harms rendered to the victim and a sufficient argument that it was the
tortfeasor's activity that resulted in the harm. Thus the findings of a
strict liability process will provide little information to the public
with regards to potential precautionary efforts or to missed oppor-
tunities for more clear standards.
Negligence requires the detailing of causation and of the precau-
tionary options and actions of the tortfeasor, in addition to the evi-
dences of harms to the victim. 362 Additionally, this information will
be made public in court, both in testimony and in rendered decisions,
so that the general public can be engaged in the decision processes to
establish appropriate activity levels and precautionary efforts.363 Fur-
thermore, this information can be transmitted to other potential tort-
feasors to both improve the cost efficiency of precautionary measures
and to measure their own levels of care vis-A-vis the now-effective ex
364
ante prescribed duty of care.
Nussim and Tabbach have provided an argument that a negligence
rule could provide a means of efficiently bootstrapping the appropri-
365
ate prescription of the optimal duty of care. When legislators and
360. See Schfifer & Maller-Langer, supra note 168, at 18.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id. The argument here is not that strict liability cases do not result in
lawsuits with publicly available information; rather, that strict liability likely leads
to a higher percentage of pre-court settlements that would remain private if not also
privileged and thus result in fewer cases making it to court. Additionally, those
cases that did reach court would provide less information than analogous negli-
gence cases. See supra discussion, at Section 4.5.
364. See id. at 19.
365. See Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172, at 173. Similarly, if the legal insti-
tutions or if the technical complexity of the risky behavior create conditions that
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judiciary officials would face high transaction costs in determining
the correct level of due care, it would be more robust if they were to
choose a negligence rule and preemptively set the level of due care
higher than the otherwise efficient level might have been; future dis-
covery in future trials could then enable a lowering of the duty of
care to optimal levels.366
5.4 Balancing of externalized costs and benefits
Hylton demonstrated that strict liability could be overburdening
and threatening to important positive externalities; he argued for the
restriction of strict liability to those case of substantially asymmetric-
al risk externalization not offset by counterbalancing externalized
benefits.367
Given the interconnections of externalized costs and benefits, he
found that negligence, strict liability, and no liability rules all have
368their respective zones of efficiency. Negligence was robust when
the externalized risks and the externalized benefits were well
369paired. Strict liability won out as more robust when risk asymme-
try, i.e., that the tortfeasor externalizes more risks than the collective
community of victims, is present and the risks increase in relative
scale to the wealth of the victims.
370
Hylton provided a review of four cases; the results are thus ambi-
guous at first glance, but they do clearly emerge from an analysis of
two relationships; 3 71 (i) the ratios of externalized probabilistic risks
between tortfeasor and victim(s), (qA:qB), and (ii) the ratios of exter-
nalized probabilistic benefits between tortfeasor and victim(s),
( 372
prevent clear ex ante determinations of judgment damages, then negligence may
provide a more robust means of achieving socially efficient outcomes. See Schfifer
& Mfiller-Langer, supra note 168, at 9.
366. See Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 172, at 173.
367. See Hylton, supra note 173, at 14.
368. See id. at 15. For no liability rules, Hylton supported the idea of subsidiza-
tion when the net welfare results were positive. See infra Quadrant III in Table 6.
369. See id, at 15, 22.
370. See id, at 23.
371. In Hylton's model, there are two parties, tortfeasor A and victim(s) B.
372. See id. at 14.
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Table 6: Liability Rule Expectations based on Externalized Benefits and Risks
External Benefits
WA > W B  WA!_ W B
qA> qB I. Negligence (probably) II. Strict Liability
., qA < qB III. Subsidy (no liability) IV. Negligence
He developed a quadrant mapping of the results, supra at Table 6:
I. (qA > qB) and (WA > WB). A provides exceptional externalized
risks and benefits. A externalizes both more risks, qA, and
more benefits, WA, than his average community of actors
externalize to the community.
373
II. (qA > qB) and (WA < WB). A is risky but of average benefits.
A externalizes more risks, qA, than the norm, but A provides
the same or fewer externalized benefits, WA, compared to
the norm in his community of actors.374
III. (qA < qB) and (WA > WB). A provides exceptional benefits at
normal risks. A provides the same or fewer externalized
risks, qA, than the norm, but externalizes more externalized
benefits, WA, against the norm in his community of ac-
tors.375
IV. (qA < qB) and (WA < WB). A is normal in externalized risk and
benefits. A provides the same or fewer externalized risks
and benefits as compared against the norms in his commu-
nity. 3
76
Hylton proposed that negligence is likely to be most effective or
efficient when the risks ratios are symmetrical or when the externa-
lized risks and benefits are well-balanced with each other because
"communities are likely to form around activities that cross-
373. See id.
374. See id.
375. See id.
376. See id.
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externalize similar risks. 3 7 7 As a result, negligence was recommend
in two out of four scenarios, making it Hylton's preferred result.
Strict liability is most likely to be of benefit to policy makers when
(qA > qB) and (WA < WB), i.e., when A displays extraordinary risks
without sufficient offsetting benefits to the community. Negligence
would see A undertake excessive activity, causing inefficiently high
numbers of accidents to B, who would reduce his own activity to mi-
nimize his damages.378
In the opposite direction is when A displays extra-ordinary benefits
to the community with average risk; such a situation might be given a
no liability rule or a subsidy, effectively the same, to encourage A to
undertake more of this beneficial activity.
379
Similarly, Nell and Richter found that as the number of potential
victims increases, and the tortfeasor is exercising a maximum feasi-
ble level of due care, 380 the correct assignment of risk allocation
should shift from the tortfeasor to the victims at large.81 Negligence
with a due care level set at the maximum level of care is the optimal
rule, whereas strict liability is equally not optimal.382
377. See id. at 15. See supra Quadrant I and IV of Table 6. Quadrant I is the
high risk/high benefit case that probably merits negligence to ensure sufficient pro-
duction of externalized benefits. Quadrant IV is the routine case wherein most or-
dinary activities with balanced risks and benefits fit.
378. See supra Quadrant II of Table 6.
379. See supra Quadrant III of Table 6.
380. Maximal level of due care as Xm. See Nell & Richter, supra note 175, at
37.
381. The risk aversions coefficients for the tortfeasor and the victim are denoted
as a and 3, respectively; where a > 0 and 3 > 0. The tortfeasor's share of liability
is q e (0 < q < 1); the victim's share of risk is similarly (1 - q) See Nell & Richter,
supra note 175, at 37, 39. The optimal liability for the tortfeasor, meeting The
optimal liability for the tortfeasor, meeting due care xm.x, is found to be:
q = A
ney + fl
382. This matches the results of the negligence rule; the negligence rule emerges
from this argument as q* - 0 as n - oo. Strict liability provides the opposite re-
sult, in q* - 1 as n - o, and assigns all of the risk to the tortfeasor. However,
one ponders if this result is real-world applicable when the victims face a unilateral
model wherein they can take no or few steps to avoid harm but the tortfeasor has
readily avoidable means to avoid risk, as in an offshore methane hydrate project
accident.
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5.5 Arguments for applying negligence to offshore methane hydrates
5.5.1 Lack of risk-averse actors in offshore methane hydrate
development
Under an analysis of risk aversion and risk allocation, the rule of
negligence was found to be more robust.383 Perhaps most important-
ly, if risk aversion does manifest in the invest decision, and a strict
liability rule is in place, it has been modeled that such a situation
could prevent socially beneficial activity from occurring at all. If the
development of methane hydrate does in fact offer the benefits that it
is expected to bear, then the rule of strict liability could prevent the
receipt of those benefits.
However, it is unlikely that the operators of offshore methane hy-
drate projects would suffer from material levels of risk aversion.
Primafacie, the investment itself is a risky enterprise, and thus inves-
tors with substantial risk aversion would likely shy away from such
project. Second, The type of operators expected to enter into the de-
velopment of offshore methane hydrates would likely have engaged
in decades of previous risky offshore oil and gas projects; if they had
once had substantial risk aversion problems, financial or otherwise,
they have likely found tools to address those concerns in the interim.
Indeed, most of the expected operators have large capital holding and
routinely self-insure on their larger projects.
Thus, it is unlikely that substantially risk-averse actors would be
engaged in offshore methane hydrate operations. Even if some ele-
ments of risk aversive behaviors survived into the nascent industry,
the existing offshore oil and gas operators would be expected to be
able to transfer know-how and means to address those concerns
without affecting their ability to rationally address their risks man-
agement strategies. As such, there is no particularly strong reason to
promote a rule of negligence merely to address risk-averse actors.
5.5.2 Insolvency of operators
The problem of potentially insolvent tortfeasors is more robustly
addressed with a rule of negligence.384 While one hopes that inves-
383. See supra discussion, at Section 5.1.1.
384. See supra discussion, at Section 5.1.2.
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tors in methane hydrate projects would not be ex ante expected to be
insolvent, all companies face the risk of insolvency.
Many corporate structures are designed to limit overall risk and
liability by limiting the amount invested within the corporate entity,
so insolvency remains an issue for daughter affiliates of an otherwise
solvent corporation. Additionally, it is routine in the oil and gas in-
dustry to place each well or lease within its own corporate entity to
enable certain financial and tax planning opportunities, 385 so capitali-
zation for the corporate entities in possession of the well may well be
insolvent against major accidents.
Insolvency of offshore methane hydrate operators is a concern to
be addressed; and as negligence is generally found more robust for
conditions facing insolvency, negligence should be preferred for off-
shore methane hydrates, at least on this issue. However, insolvency
can be addressed within a regulatory framework as well, to better en-
sure that sufficient capital stocks and insurance policies are instituted
to minimize the potential of operators to become insolvent while li-
censed to operate offshore methane hydrate installations.386 E.g.,
mandates could be required to ensure that the corporations holding
offshore methane hydrate installations remain solvent or retain cer-
tain levels of capital funding to prevent insolvency from becoming a
functional problem.387
Thus there is a finding that insolvency would potentially remain a
risk for the development of offshore methane hydrate operators, but
that a rule of negligence is neither the exclusive means nor necessari-
ly the optimal means with which to address the problem.
5.5.3 Strategic operators: avoidance and precaution
The traditional operators of offshore oil and gas installations are
financially sophisticated; they routinely have very large-scale in-
385. One such strategy is known as "worthless stock deduction" planning, which
enables pass-through of dry-hole losses to tax accounts while receiving uplift on
producing wells via tax credits.
386. See discussion, infra Section 6.3.
387. E.g., many licensing and permitting regulations require certain financial
proofs of sufficient financial reserves to operate such offshore installations. Addi-
tionally, many corporate acts enable look-through or veil-piercing rules when cor-
porate behavior is financially tortious, as such might well be the case in certain
avoidance strategies following major industrial accidents.
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vestments in offshore projects in multiple jurisdictions around the
globe.388 It is to be expected that these investors would be fully
aware of functional means of avoidance and of precaution and that
their legal counsel would be engaged in ensuring that those corpora-
tions bore no legally unnecessary levels of liabilities. But that is not
the same as to suggest that these parties have incentives to strategi-
cally avoid their liabilities.
However, there are always certain risks that certain corporate
structures, intended for other financial or tax planning purposes,
might effectively create similar results to avoidance stratagems. It is
not unusual for the financial operations of an offshore investment to
operate primary beyond the local jurisdiction of a wellsite or pro-
ject. 3 89 Similarly, operational control might be structured in a man-
ner that the operational joint venture sits beyond the local
jurisdiction. 390 And of course, there will always be reference to such
corporate characters as Enron, who left many in the public wary of
the bonafides of major corporations. Thus, although this present au-
thor would expect few direct bad faith avoidance strategies, it is rea-
sonable to expect that other good faith measures might create de
facto results too similar to ignore.
But there are many existing regulations in place to reduce the over-
all risk to be addressed by the choice of civil liability rules. Thus,
while the opportunity for avoidance strategies could be present dur-
ing the development and operation of offshore methane hydrate op-
388. Just the list of ExxonMobil, RD Shell, Chevron, and BP conjure the very
idea of sophisticated international corporations. But it is not only these major in-
dependent oil corporations (IOCs) that investors, as there are a wide variety of ma-
jor national oil corporations (NOCs) that often dwarf these IOCs in financial
capacity and access to markets. It has been reported that NOCs now control over
90% of the world's conventional oil and gas reserves, are currently exceeding IOC
investments in R&D by 20% p.a., and generally receive more favorable terms in
the financial markets when raising capital. JORGE LEIS, JOHN MCCREERY & JUAN
C. GAY, BAIN & Co., NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES RESHAPE THE PLAYING FIELD 1-2
(2012), available at http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/national-oil-
companies-reshape-the-playing-field.aspx.
389. Such planning could be required for various corporate law compliance re-
quirements or to efficiently structure dividend and tax obligations.
390. E.g., the joint venturers might hold the project in a partnership in country A,
which then holds the project within a corporation within country B. Operational
decisions could be executed from within jurisdiction A since the corporation lo-
cated in B would be wholly owned and operated by the parental partnership.
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erations, and while a rule of negligence might be more robust for this
particular concern, regulations, particularly pre-existing regulations,
might functionally pre-empt the advantages provided by a rule of
negligence.
5.5.4 Behavioural operators of offshore methane hydrate projects
To the extent that modeling has been undertaken on the role of be-
havioral economics and law, it emerges that negligence is more ro-
bust at dealing with the routine errors identified by behavioral
economists. 39 1 Humans are generally observed underestimating the
chances that they can avoid environmental accidents. At the same
time, they are overly pessimistic about catastrophic accidents. Both
types of events are potentially part of a methane hydrate event, and
thus these behavioral impacts are important to consider.
However, the types of corporations and other investment bodies
likely to engage in the development and commercialization of off-
shore methane hydrate assets are not likely to suffer from these beha-
vioral defects. First, their financial decision processes are far
removed from singular decision makers; the teams of managers, en-
gineers, lawyers, and investors required to execute a successful me-
thane hydrate project would require operational procedures of control
that would do much to offset any behavioral economic issues such as
might be found in natural humans.
This is not to suggest that those decision-making procedures would
not contain the potential for error, just that the behavioral concerns of
optimism and pessimism would be expected to be mitigated by cor-
porate controls procedures. As such, behavioral economics is not
likely to be a prevailing concern of governing methane hydrate acci-
dent risk. Ergo, behavioral economics will not present sufficient ar-
gument for the application of a rule of negligence for offshore
methane hydrate projects.
5.5.5 Insurance markets and the operators of offshore methane
hydrate projects
A rule of negligence is more robust when insurance markets are
imperfect. 392 The insurance market for methane hydrate accidents
391. See supra discussion, at Section 5.1.4.
392. See supra discussion, at Section 5.1.1.
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will need to be responsive to the novel harms of offshore methane
hydrates. It is unclear at this time how that might be done, thus,
functionally it is unclear what kinds of insurance products would be
available to investors in offshore methane hydrate installations.
The industry of methane hydrates is novel and the risks are to some
extent unknowable until a certain amount of operational experience
accrues. The potential costs of harms from the more extreme cases
could need to respond to tsunami and landslide impacts on coastal
communities, to respond to certain economic losses from those inju-
ries and potentially respond to mass loss of lives; such a risk would
be extremely expensive. Not to say that there are not means availa-
ble, but the more financially demanding a market is, the more likely
it is to reach problems.
Given the particular risks of the novel industry, a rule of negli-
gence may be more efficient for methane hydrate accidents. Howev-
er, the expected operators of offshore methane hydrate installations,
as discussed supra at section 5.1.1 with regards to risk aversion, have
likely addressed similar concerns before and have the financial so-
phistication to address these types of concerns. The major existing
operators have deep financial capacity to self-insure and to purchase
insurance. 393 As such, there is not a pressing need to employ a rule
of negligence to remedy the potential problems posed by a lack of in-
surance.
5.5.6 Addressing imperfect or inaccurate sanctions against methane
hydrate accidents
If the expected judgments do not match the actual harms,394 or if
there is systematic slack in the assignment of judgments,395 negli-
gence has been found more robust at achieving proper levels of pre-
caution. To the extent that real world conditions following a methane
393. E.g., as was seen at the BP Macondo incident, BP was able to immediately
produce $20 billion to establish the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, a type of settlement
fund, prior to the onset of tort litigation. It is generally understood that the funding
came solely from BP's own capital and current revenues. It is not unlikely that this
particular industry would be unable to provide its own insurance if the market was
otherwise unable to support such a need.
394. See supra discussion, at Section 5.2.
395. See supra discussion, at Section 5.2.
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hydrate accident may mismatch, and one certainly might think it
possible, the choice of rule should be for negligence.
But the types of accidents that might befall an offshore methane
hydrate operation are not likely to result in precision injuries or dam-
ages. Both the non-cataclysmic and cataclysmic injuries would be
expected to either be limited primarily to the wellsite, and thus by-
pass this concern, or affect a larger onshore community of residents.
Should the accident affect an onshore community, damages will be at
best approximations.396 But the critical question to ask is whether the
difference in damages would be sufficient for an actor under strict
liability to reduce their level of precaution. In the case of offshore
methane hydrates, it would appear that the tortfeasor would stand to
lose on their own personal account, in terms of loss of revenue, prop-
erty, and personnel, that one reasonably wonders if additional incen-
tives would be necessary to motivate efficient levels of precaution.
This particular concern, of inaccurate damages and the potential to
provide insufficient incentives to maintain sufficient levels of precau-
tionary efforts, is perhaps one of the stronger arguments for the dep-
loyment of a negligence rule. However, it remains unclear, given the
private incentives of the tortfeasors, that such would be necessary.
5.5.7 Need for data transparency
Negligence offers an opportunity to present more evidence and ar-
guments at trial than strict liability would require. Thus it has been
argued that perhaps a rule of negligence can be usefully employed to
provide information to the courts and to the public that could enable
efficient determinations of appropriate precaution and activity lev-
els.397
The commercial development of methane hydrates faces perhaps a
somewhat unique situation in that its basic science and engineering
have been primarily developed under the subsidies and guidance of
national governments. As such, a large body of information on the
risk and hazards of that same technology will be publicly available
396. If an onshore community is impacted by a methane hydrate accident, one
would expect a large number of claims on a wide variety of matters. Also, in cer-
tain cases, particularly after more severe accidents, records or evidences might be
damaged or lost in the cataclysms following. Therefore, precise determinations of
injuries might not be efficiently or even feasibly rendered for such cases.
397. See supra discussion, at Section 5.3.
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prior to the first applications for commercial development. Further,
many nations require EIAs to be completed prior to the approval or
licensing for new projects, improving the likelihood that offshore
methane hydrate projects would not be developed without public
awareness of its risks and hazards. Thus the risk of insufficient data
for public determination of appropriate precaution and activity levels
is relatively lighter for offshore methane hydrates than many other
new industrial processes that were developed without such ex ante
public involvement. As such, there is little to no need to apply the
rule of negligence to offshore methane hydrate projects based on this
concern.
5.5.8 Balancing of externalized benefits and risks
Gilead and Hylton, separately, have both provided an analysis of
determining rules of civil liability based on the ratios of externalized
social benefits and social costs. 398 Each determination must first re-
solve the ratios of externalized risks and of externalized benefits. A
case could be made that the benefits of offshore methane hydrate
projects would match or exceed their risks; but it is also not unfore-
seeable that some stakeholder might envision lower potential benefits
of additional methane exploitation.
The rule of strict liability should be applied if and when the tort-
feasor's externalized risks exceed those posed by the victim and
when the tortfeasor's externalized benefits are the same or less than
those posed by the victim. Methane hydrate projects will externalize
a substantial amount of risk, certainly in excess of the externalized
risks from the potential victims.
However, the development of methane hydrate projects is also po-
tentially of substantial externalized benefits in significant excess over
the externalized benefits posed by the potential victims. Thus, it is
questionable that the ratios of a methane hydrate project support the
application of strict liability. Hylton suggests that when the tortfea-
sor externalizes asymmetrical benefits and costs that a rule of negli-
gence should probably be applied.
Such is the case herein that the externalized risks are more readily
foreseeable but one could reasonably expect some divergence
amongst policy makers on the balance of externalized benefits. For
398. See Gilead, supra note 305. See also Hylton, supra note 173.
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this reason, Hylton's four-quadrant model of civil liability rules
might not render a clear determination which quadrant offshore me-
thane hydrate might sit within; as such, Hylton's method is indeter-
minate for offshore methane hydrate projects.
Gilead's model of the "Gap" provides additional insight into the
complexities caused by not only the symmetries or asymmetries of
externalized costs and benefits but also to the impact on rule choice
when those asymmetries are compounded by a "Gap" in estimating
the privately assessed damages versus the actual public negative ex-
ternality. 399 Gilead does provide insight into when strict liability
might be robust than negligence in such conditions, and that is when
the internalized "Gap" is small. 400 Additionally, Gilead advised that
strict liability should be applied when externalized costs are high and
401 *only limited welfare benefits are generated for third parties; in this
he and Hylton align.
6. COMPLEXITY IN IMPLEMENTION
One of the problems of implementing rules of civil liability is sim-
ple complexity, there are many several manners in which the rules
can be frustrated if not correctly implemented or if the circumstances
are not sufficiently compatible. Hereunder a quick survey of several
concern areas is developed. Particular attention is made to both the
impact on selection of strict liability versus negligence and on the
impact of the circumstances of offshore methane hydrate operations.
6.1 Difficulties of long-term liability issues.
From the dateline of the FID402 for a methane hydrate project, the
development period might last 5 to 10 years and the production pe-
399. See Gilead, supra note 302, enpassim.
400. See id. at 607.
401. See id. at 608.
402. FID stands for "Financial Investment Decision." FID can refer both to the
decision and to the date of the decision to initiate the development, production and
marketing phases of a hydrocarbon field. It is commonplace for FID models to an-
ticipate cost structures and potential revenue forecasts from FID till abandonment.
FID models attempt to determine the overall profitability of a given project over
the whole lifetime of the project to create a metric that can enable projects to com-
pete for limited capital resources within the operator's assets.
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riod several decades beyond that to potentially much longer. The ab-
andonment and sequestration phase of a methane hydrate project
could last decades to much, much longer, especially if the methane
hydrate project engaged in carbon sequestration alongside the me-
thane production. The time frame of risk, from FID to the final risky
event, could be a century or more in length.
The decision at FID is to initiate this very long sequence of risky
events; how can the operator make that decision if actors might be-
come liable after the decision, or if duties of precaution change after
behaviors are undertaken, or if future liabilities even matter given
sufficient passage of time? These are problems of time frame man-
agement; the next three sections of this study are focused on these is-
sues. This first section discusses the challenges of ex post facto
determinations of liability. The next two sections discuss ex post
changes in the expected levels of precaution and time frame man-
agement.
When an activity that was previously not a source of liability later
becomes a source of liability, an ex post facto determination of liabil-
ity, then the operator would not have received the incentive it needed
to operate efficiently. Thus, it would appear to have no validity as a
tool to reduce the incidence of accidents. 40 3 On the other hand, if op-
erators suspect that additional future liabilities may be determined ex
post, then they might actually be receiving an incentive to reduce
their overall precautions; 40 4 it becomes effectively the same math as
operating with an expectation that one might be find liable regardless
of behavior, so the care level is reduced.
Another way in which incentives can become muddled is when the
judicially enforced duty of care is changed as time goes by and be-
comes a new liability rule ex post facto for events from the past. One
could make a reasonable assumption that in most cases that duty of
care level change would result in a higher level of care. Indeed, the
foreseeability of such a reasonable assumption was studied by Sha-
vell; it is reasonable in some cases for an operator to assume that du-
403. See Faure, supra note 149, at 261.
404. See Faure, supra note 149, at 261; (citing to James Boyd & Howard Ku-
nreuther, Retroactive Liability or the Public Purse?, 11 J. REG. ECON. 79 (1997)).
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ty of care levels would increase over time so that they should take
such foreseeable adjustments into account ex ante.405
But is this ultimately efficient, to require an operator to forecast
both technological advancements and social responses to that new
knowledge; indeed, "is it even feasible?" one might ask. Indeed,
there are substantial dangers to this approach in that it might lead to
over-deterrence in the regulated activity and cause a decrease in
overall welfare.4 o6
The development of methane hydrate projects is likely to spur rap-
id advancement in both the underlying associated technologies and in
the public's awareness and understanding of the risks and benefits of
methane hydrate projects. To that extent, if operators needed to take
any and all foreseeable or possible ex post changes to liability into
account, it would likely have the effect of setting a higher bar to entry
than the inclusion of ex ante liability rules. That higher standards
would evolve over time is of course a most reasonable thing.407
American common law has a tool called prospective overruling, that
enables a judge to rule on a specific case that for the immediate de-
fendant that the older duty of care applied but prospective and future
408cases would be held under a new standard of care.
While operators are to be held liable, it is foreseeable that methane
hydrate projects that span decades of operation might outlast the ini-
tial operators or even outlast the regulatory body that originally li-
censed and permitted the project. The decisions to be made the
initial operator at the time of the development and production phases
will have an impact on overall safety and reliability over the whole
time-frame yet the foreseeability that the operator may not be solvent
or in operations that far into the future plus the toll that discount rates
will have on the economic decisions related to the project will strong-
405. See Faure, supra note 149, at 262 (citing Steven Shavell, Liability and the
Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1992)).
406. See Faure, supra note 149, at 262.
407. See id. at 263 (citing Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schfifer, Negligence as Unta-
ken Precaution, Limited Information, and Efficient Standard Formation in The Civ-
il Liability System, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 15 (1997); and Alfred Endres &
Regina Bertram, The Development of Care Technology Under Liability Law, 26
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (2006)).
408. See James Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman, The Search for Deep Pockets: Is
"Extended Liability" Expensive Liability?, 13 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 232 (1997).
See also Faure, supra note 149, at 263.
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ly limit the serous and due consideration of some of the risks of the
project. For this reason, it should be considered that liability rules
might not be completely efficient at mitigating all of the risks of me-
thane hydrate projects.
However, there are several reasons to hold that most of the deci-
sions made for the long-term risks actually are identical to decisions
to be made for more near-in-time risks for which the operators are
indeed likely to take liability rules into consideration. Thus, while
the long-term long tail risks are present within methane hydrate
projects, it is unlikely to cause unique or specific risks otherwise un-
accounted for by the already suggested combination of regulation and
liability rules.
First, the risks for offshore methane hydrates are likely to be front
loaded, in that technology and practical experience will build over
time making precautionary planning more accurate and thus more ef-
ficient. Accidents are reasonably more likely to happen in the early
years as the learning curve builds. Thus a potential majority of the
risks for the initial operator are in the early decades.
Second, the discount rate on financial accounting will also create a
focus for near term safety, as interruptions to operations in early
years could be substantial impediments to the overall return-on-
investment for the project.
Third, and perhaps unique to offshore methane hydrates, the need
to replace wells and continue with in-field development over time
means that while the field itself might remain in operation for scores
of years, localized wellsites will rotate in and out of production more
frequently so that the whole life cycle of production and abandon-
ment might be encountered at some sites within the first several dec-
ades of production. The types of activities to be seen at the end of
the field will actually be seen at some of the earlier wellsites within
decades of the field's start-up.
Finally, the sequestration and abandonment of methane hydrate
fields is expected to be endothermic and thus self-stabilizing or self-
cementing, somewhat unlike the re-injection of natural gas (CH 4) or
carbon dioxide (C0 2) into conventional depleted reservoirs. Thus,
one might reasonably conclude that the project operators will focus
on the near-term risks in alignment with long-term risks; albeit short-
term here might reference to a period of several decades.
To the extent that carbon sequestration is a co-factor of the aban-
doning and sequestration of the methane hydrate field, the rules and
2015]
304 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
regulations addressing CCS should be applied; 40 9 CCS within and
without methane hydrate projects should face a common regulatory
structure.
6.2 Real world overlap in implementations of strict liability and
negligence
There are a variety of ways in which the theoretical versions of
strict liability and negligence differ from their implementations in the
real world. In particular, as various defenses and different precautio-
nary standards are coordinated with either rule, the functional results
tend to blend or merge into a continuum. For example, the Oil Pollu-
tion Act (OPA) provides for a rule of strict liability to be imposed on
those who spill oil into a marine environment; 4 but it also deter-
mines the provision, or lack thereof, of liability caps based on wheth-
er grossly negligent behavior was involved in causing the oil spill.
So the OPA is a rule of strict liability that still calls for an examina-
tion of the level of precaution undertaken at the time of the accident.
Traditional nuisance also functions in-between strict liability and
negligence. 4 1 Nuisance functions akin to negligence in its determi-
nation of a violation of a conduct norm; as such, if a tort could be
properly classified as a nuisance then it would be properly governed
412by a rule of strict liability. Nuisance law holds a tortfeasor liable
only if he has "unreasonably interfered" with the use and enjoyment
of another's land; this unreasonable interference tests the balancing
of externalized benefits and externalized costs. 4 13 E.g., when the
courts find reasonable exchange benefits and harms, the courts will
414find no occurrence of nuisance.
409. There is much interest in replacing the extracted methane volumes with car-
bon dioxide volumes. Indeed, both Germany and Japan have actively invested in
this potential means of obtaining carbon-neutral methane volumes.
410. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, PL 101-380, 104 Stat 484 (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. § 2701 etseq. (2012)).
411. Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 4 J. TORT L. 11
(2012).
412. Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regu-
lation, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 531-533 (2001); see also Hylton, supra note 173,
en passim.
413. See Hylton, supra note 419, at 9.
414. See id.
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Hylton has argued that it lays closer to strict liability. Hylton's
model of strict liability suggested that nuisance is a situation wherein
typically the risks caused by the activity are unreciprocated by other
actors or activities, so a state of excessive externalized risks prevails
in a nuisance. 415 It is not explicitly stated, but the analysis implicitly
assumes that the nuisance provides insufficient externalized welfare
benefits conditions, in that no substantial externalized social benefits
accrue from the nuisance generating activity. 4 16 As such, the model
presented integrates nuisance alongside strict liability in alignment
417with his model's externalized risk versus benefit analysis.
Thus, in conclusion, while a modeler might propose the adoption
of strict liability or negligence, the policy maker must be aware that
combining that rule with additional defenses or standards of precau-
tions could lead to unanticipated results vis-A-vis the efficient gover-
nance of risk from accidents. Likewise, modelers should take care to
advise with awareness of the existing institutional preferences and
biases within each jurisdiction to ensure that the functional result is
obtained, even if the name on the civil rule is other than that advised
in the model.
6.3 Roles for public and private regulations to complement strict
liability
There are many reasons to suspect that the rules of civil liabilities
and systems of regulation could be used in a complementary man-
ner.418 Indeed, Gunningham and Sinclair have stated that "'single in-
415. In the mathematical phrasing of his model, qA > qB. See also Hylton, supra
note 173, at 21-22.
416. In the mathematical phrasing of his model, wA < wB. See id at 21.
417. See Hylton, supra note 173, at 15, 21-22. Hylton stated that nuisance could
also be identified by the six-part test for abnormally dangerous activities from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
418. See Charles D. Kolstad, Thomas S. Ulen & Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post
Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 888 (1990). See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental
Liability Law, in INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ASPECTS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND
LIABILITY 223 (Thomas H. Tietenberg ed., 1992); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Public
Law Versus Private Law in Environmental Regulation: European Union Proposals
in the Light of United States Experience, 4 REV. EUR. COMMUN. & INT'L ENVTL.
L. 312 (1995). See also Michael G. Faure & M. Ruegg, Environmental Standard
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strument' or 'single strategy' approaches are misguided," but that "in
the large majority of circumstances (though certainly not all), a mix
of instruments is required, tailored to specific policy goals, 419 There
is a broad understanding within the literature that for environmental
hazards, the coordinated implementation of civil liability rules and
regulations could be more robust than the singular application of ei-
ther. 420 This section provides but a brief introduction into the poten-
tial overlap of public and private regulations with rules of civil
liability. 421
Rules of strict liability provide optimally for the accident risks of
unilateral accidents, certain bilateral accidents, and abnormally haz-
ardous accidents, among others; 422 but rules of strict liability cannot
efficiently provide incentives for certain circumstances; complemen-
tary regulations could assist to remedy those circumstances. 423 Thus,
where strict liability might be inefficient, public or private regula-
tions might complement it.
Even if strict liability found itself within a robust scenario, effec-
tive enforcement of any civil liability would still be predicated on
424three issues; (i) the probability of the violation's detection, (ii)
Setting Through General Principles of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK 39
(Michael G. Faure, John A. E. Vervaele & Albert Weale, eds., 1994). See also P.
Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External
Costs, 19(2) Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 227 (1999); and see Alessandra Arcuri, Control-
ling Environmental Risk in Europe: The Complementary Role of an EC Environ-
mental Liability Regime, 15(2) TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR MILIEUAANSPRAKELIJKHEID 39
(2001). See also Faure, supra note 268, at 143; and see Faure, supra note 268, at
24.
419. Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Pol-
icy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 L & POL'Y 49, 50 (1999).
420. Michael G. Faure & Stefan E. Weishaar, The Role of Environmental Taxa-
tion: Economics and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL
TAXATION 399, 405-406 (Jane E. Milne & Mikael S. Andersen eds., Edward El-
gar, 2012).
421. See Roy A. Partain, Public and Private Regulations for the Governance of
the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates (working paper) (on file with Rotterdam
Institute for Law & Economics (RILE)), available at
http ://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-2466079.
422. See supra discussions on when strict liability is more robust than negligence.
423. See supra discussions on when strict liability is less robust than negligence.
424. See Hylton, supra note 419, at 12.
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once detected, the probability of prosecution, and (iii) the probability
of punishment once prosecuted.425 Problems at any one of more of
these stages can cause otherwise effective civil liability regimes to be
frustrated; public regulations are seen as potentially able to address
those problems.426 Given the complexity of the science and engi-
neering related to methane hydrates and the vast variety of states and
legal systems that would face the development of offshore methane
hydrates and their potential harms, such conditions would be neither
rare nor hard to imagine.
And even if strict liability were in a robust scenario and if none of
the above problems were present, Shavell found three criteria that
suggested when liability rules might not be effective despite other-
wise appearing to be functional. The three reasons were: (i) prob-
lems of information asymmetry, (ii) risks of insolvent tortfeasors, and
the (iii) effective absence of lawsuits from victims. Thus for multiple
reasons, public and private regulations might become needed to gap-
fill and balance the portfolio of risk governance mechanisms.
Public regulations may be expensive to operate, 428 may be poorly
focused on activity instead of results, may be insufficiently written to
achieve optimal targets, may prevent decentralization, and they may
effectively reduce incentives for tortfeasors to achieve optimal levels
of precaution and activity level setting. 4 29 Many of these flaws are
inherent in the benefits of regulation; e.g., the expenses of operating a
regulatory framework are often due to the costs of collecting infor-
mation about the various tortfeasors and the character of their activi-
ties - this is the very collection of data that was valued as a reason to
425. See id. at 4.
426. See id.
427. See Shavell, supra note 267; see also Steven Shavell, A Model of the Op-
timal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 271 (1984); Sha-
vell, ACCIDENT LAW, supra note 150.
428. Rules of civil liability are generally seen as a "relatively cheap instrument"
in contrast to the "higher system costs" of regulation. The formulation of detailed
ex ante norms, the coordination costs of aligning inconsistent policies across diver-
gent bureaucracies, and the costs of monitoring can all lead to regulations being
more costly than rules of civil liability. See Roger Van den Bergh & Louis T. Vis-
scher, Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law, in MITIGATING RISK IN THE CONTEXT OF
SAFETY AND SECURITY. How RELEVANT IS A RATIONAL APPROACH? 29 (Richard V.
de Mulder ed., Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam 2008).
429. See Faure, supra note 268, at 26.
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implement regulations. As such, where regulations are weak is often
well aligned with where civil liability rules are efficient; thus the ar-
gument for the complementary implementation of civil liability rules
and regulations is well founded.
Private regulations are sometimes proposed as alternatives to pub-
lic regulations, but increasingly in the literature private regulation is
spoken of as a complement to public regulation and rules of civil lia-
bility. Private regulations enable those possessing specialized know-
ledge on the risk activity to develop standards. The ability of certain
interested private actors to remain avant-garde is especially relevant
when risky activities are highly novel and in a state of rapid innova-
tion, because public regulations might not be able to keep abreast of
the optimal standards as precautionary technologies and scientific
understandings of the risks and hazards progress. 430 Also, where le-
gal institutions are less likely to be able to process the technological
or scientific challenges of the risky activity,431 then it might be bene-
ficial to address those risks with the assistance of private regulations.
For offshore methane hydrates, it is likely that both of the above con-
ditions would be present in many of the locations that such hydrates
would be located.
However, there are concerns on the capability of private regulation
to provide fair and efficient regulation of risky activities:432 (i) in-
dustry needs to earn public trust, (ii) danger of weak enforcement,
(iii) self-serving regulation, not necessarily in public interest, (iv)
creation of barriers to entry, (v) uncertain legitimacy within demo-
cratic and open societies, and (vi) governmental limits and "condi-
430. Shavell addressed the theoretical origins of regulatory stickiness in a discus-
sion on insurance contracts over long time periods. See Steven Shavell, Sharing
Risks of Deferred Payment, 84 J. POL. ECON. 161 (1976). Stickiness is related to
a variety of phenomena, primarily the complex interactions of various transaction
costs, which prevent more continuous adjustments to pricing/cost data over time.
In this study, regulations are discussed as a form of technology and the choice to
adopt up-to-date technologies is affected so that the choice of technology becomes
sticky, the regulations are not frequently updated.
431. Anthony Ogus & Emanuela Carbonara, Self-regulation, in PRODUCTION OF
LEGAL RULES, 232-234 (Francesco Parisi ed., Edward Elgar Publishers Ltd., 2011).
See also Michael G. Faure, Morag Goodwin & Franziska Weber, Bucking the
Kuznets Curve: Designing Effective Environmental Regulation in Developing
Countries, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 95 (2010).
432. Ogus & Carbonara, supra note 438, at 234.
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tional self-regulation." Historical experience is full of examples
wherein industrial groups failed to exercise due care, or at least levels
of care that would have been socially acceptable by the rest of socie-
ty. Thus again, one might fin it reasonable that if private regulations
were to play a significant role in addressing the risk and hazards of
offshore methane hydrates, that rules of civil liability should be kept
in play, and in particular, a rule of strict liability to provide economic
incentives to the those private regulators to remind them that they
will bear the costs of whatever damages their activities might cause.
In summary, while a rule of strict liability would appear to be the
most robust rule of civil liability against the facts and circumstances
of offshore methane hydrates, there will likely be events or situations
that frustrate the application of that rule. As such, public and private
regulation could be adopted in a complementary implementation to
provide a more complete set and balanced set of incentives to the
tortfeasors.
7. GOVERNING OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES WITH STRICT
LIABILITY
This study has attempted to provide a study of which rule of civil
liability would be preferable for the commercial development of off-
shore methane hydrates. The fundamental advantages of both rules
were evaluated in turn. Strict liability was found to be preferable for
a variety of circumstances likely to match the circumstances of off-
shore methane hydrate operations; ergo, strict liability was found
likely to be more robust than negligence in efficiently governing the
risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates.
7.1 Summary of theoretical analysis
This study has reviewed the rules of civil liability, strict liability
and negligence. Both rules of civil liability, strict liability and negli-
gence, can be efficient within their own clusters of fitting circums-
tances. When determining which rule would be more effective, it is
to the circumstances of the activity that we should look.
Strict liability is more robust than negligence in unilateral acci-
dents or for bilateral accidents wherein the tortfeasor controls most of
the incidents of risk. Strict liability is also preferable when address-
ing the risks of abnormally hazardous activities; public welfare might
benefit from the activity itself but the management of the risk is diffi-
2015]
310 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
cult or perhaps infeasible by any party other that the undertaker, i.e.,
the potential tortfeasor. Strict liability enables the complete set of
costs and benefits, including those externalized, to be addressed by a
single decision maker; that focus of information and control enables
the efficiency of strict liability for the above situations. Also, be-
cause the determinations on optimal precaution and activity levels are
made by the tortfeasor, they can correctly integrate local marginal
costs and benefits and thus gain access to decentralization. It appears
that for a variety of uncertainties, strict liability can be more robust
than negligence.433
The rule of negligence has its own domains of efficiency. The
more likely it becomes that victims have a role to play in averting
harm, the more likely negligence is efficient to govern the combined
risks of the tortfeasor and the victim. The more likely that risk neu-
trality is replaced with risk aversion, the more likely negligence will
be more robust. Similarly, the presence of insolvency, strategies of
liability avoidance, incorrectly estimated judicial damages, or the ef-
fects of behavioral economics can all present circumstances to sup-
port negligence as a more robust rule than strict liability. Again,
depending on the circumstances of the accident, a rule of negligence
might be efficient to govern the risks and hazards of that activity.
7.2 Applied Analysis to risks and hazards of offshore methane
hydrates
The present study has assayed the arguments for both strict liability
and negligence and found that the application of strict liability to the
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates was more likely to pro-
vide for robust and optimal governance of their risks and hazards.
The character of offshore methane hydrate accidents are expected
to be primarily unilateral in nature, strict liability is efficient for that
case. Even when bilateral types of accidents could occur it was
found that the primary ability to prevent or manage those accidents
would remain dominantly in the operator's control thus strict liability
would be more efficient to govern the operator. The character of the
expected development, production, and abandonment and sequestra-
tion activities would likely qualify as abnormally hazardous activities
433. See a similar conclusion on the potentially more robust application of strict
liability to environmental pollution by Faure & Weishaar, supra note 427, at 403.
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and thus merit governance under a rule of strict liability. To the ex-
tent that certain ex ante standards of care or precaution are unclear or
remain in formation, and one would reasonably expect such standards
to be in evolution given the novelty of offshore methane hydrate op-
erations, strict liability would be a more robust mechanism than a
rule of negligence. A rule of strict liability provides no indemnifica-
tion for meeting a duty of care and thus provides a more clear incen-
tive to the potential operators to innovate in matters of safety and
precaution. Given the diversity of risks and hazards of offshore
methane hydrates and the emergent need to address those risks with
technological solutions, strict liability's capacity to provide those
aforementioned incentives for safety and precautionary innovations
would be preferred over the weaker incentives provided by a rule of
negligence. Additionally, the literature supported findings that a rule
of strict liability could be more efficient in addressing the transaction
costs of justice. A rule of strict liability might ultimately prevent
problems of complex interaction between the victims. Further, the
implementation of a rule of strict liability would enable the attain-
ment of decentralization; decentralization would enable each operator
to achieve optimal levels of offshore methane hydrate activities with
optimal levels of safety and precaution as based on upon their own
unique technology sets and cost functions.
The potential application of a rule of negligence was reviewed; the
results supported the choice of strict liability. The circumstances of
offshore methane hydrate activities were investigated to determine if
various issues known to be more robustly addressed by a rule of neg-
ligence would be present. Risk averse operators, insolvent operators,
operators demonstrating strategic avoidance of liabilities, operators
facing imperfect insurance markets, and operators facing mis-
estimated damages were all reviewed; it was generally found that the
circumstances of offshore methane hydrates did not present these
risks in a manner that supported the application of a rule of negli-
gence.
It may well be that in the modern world that the lines between
strict liability and negligence have blurred in practice. Almost no-
where do strict liability and negligence exist in the pure state em-
ployed by the theoretical models. And almost nowhere do the rules
of civil liability operate in a vacuum free of regulatory framework
somehow addressing safety and responsibility in one form or another.
But no foundation was discovered within those concerns for switch-
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ing from a recommendation for strict liability to efficiently govern
the risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrate projects.
In conclusions, it is recognized that no theoretical rule of civil lia-
bility would ever perfectly fit a real world activity and that in the
modern world it is very more certain that an activity like methane
hydrate exploitation would face some complex circumstances. Nev-
ertheless, the conclusion is affirmed by a review of the advantages of
strict liability, of negligence, and of the complexities of implementa-
tion that the rule of strict liability is the more preferable of the two
rules for application to the development of offshore methane hy-
drates. This is in alignment with the broader trends of evolving envi-
ronmental law, as strict liability is increasingly viewed as the default
preference for environmental torts.434
434. See a discussion on the passage of strict liability rules within European
states and the European Union in Faure, supra note 268, at 138.
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